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NOTES
SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTES: THE INTERPLAY
OF THE TAKINGS AND EXCESSIVE FINES
CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
The rate of tort litigation' and the aggregate cost of the civil jus-
tice system in the United States grew rapidly in the 1980s.2 One of the
most startling manifestations of this growth was an increase in the size
of punitive damage awards.3 As Justice O'Connor observed in Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,4 "[a]wards of punitive dam-
ages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award
of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products lia-
bility case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than thirty times as
high have been sustained on appeal."5
1 See Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. INFO. INsr. REP., Sept. 1993 (reporting that
the filing of tort cases in state courts grew about 18% from 1985 to 1991 according to the
National Center for State Courts).
2 Id. (noting that a report by the Hartford-based actuarial consulting firm Tillinghast
estimates the cost of the American civil justice system-including expenditures for admin-
istration, damages, and attorney fees-to be about $132 billion annually). Americans pay a
great deal to finance the costs of the tort system. For example, a 1992 study by the Center
for Economic Development and Research at the University of North Texas concluded that
Texans pay $12 billion in "tort taxes" annually. Id. For a general comparison of the rate
of litigation and relative tort liability costs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, see
David Flum & Frank Wolfe, If You Gotta Get Sued, Get Sued in Utah, FoRBEs, Jan. 17, 1994, at
70 (including tables comparing likelihood to be sued in a tort action and various tort
liability costs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia).
3 See, e.g.,John C.Jeffries,Jr., Commentary: A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 139 (1986) ("As everyone who reads the newspapers must
know, the American civil liability system is approaching a crisis. One prominent aspect of
this crisis is the problem of punitive damages. In my view, punitive damages are out of
control."); see also Joseph Perkins, Courtroom Casinos: Juries are Dealing Out Absurdly Huge
Awards, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRB.,Jan. 21, 1994, at B5 (reporting that a 1992 working paper
by the Washington Legal Foundation showed that the total sum of punitive damage awards
in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, properly accounting for inflation, was
89 times greater between 1988 and 1991 than it had been between 1968 and 1971); Texas
Punitive Damages Awards Held to Hurt State's Economy, LaAB. WL-, Apr. 11, 1994 (1994 study by
the Texas Public Policy Foundation revealed great increase in the average size of punitive
damage awards in various Texas counties during the 1980s; in Dallas County, for example,
the average award increased from $59,252 in 1978-81 to $1,133,634 in 1988-92).
4 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
5 Id. at 282 (O'Cbnnor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omit-
ted). One could even considerJustice O'Connor's observation to be an understatement of
the dramatic growth in the size of some punitive awards. SeeTexaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.,
729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ($1 billion punitive award for tortious interference
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The dramatic growth in tort litigation and recoveries resulted in
calls for tort reform.6 Two fundamental problems caused reformers
to focus their efforts on punitive damages. First, punitive damages
sometimes excessively penalize defendants, especially in mass tort
cases where one defendant might be subject to multiple punitive dam-
age awards for a single course of conduct.7 Second, punitive damages
create a windfall for the plaintiff, who in theory has already been fully
compensated by an award of compensatory damages.8 Many state leg-
islatures and courts responded to these two problems of punitive dam-
ages by restricting the availability of punitive damage awards.9
Some state legislatures, seeking to limit the recovery of punitive
awards by plaintiffs, enacted a new type of remedy: "split-recovery"
statutes. 10 These statutes require plaintiffs to share a percentage of
punitive damage awards with the general public." Some allocate the
with a contract affirmed after it was reduced from $3 billion), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994
(1988); Thomas S. Mulligan & Michael Parrish, Exxon Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Oil Spill,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at Al (reporting that a federal jury in Alaska recently awarded
$5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon Corp. for its role in the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill). Indeed, courts have tolerated not only large punitive damage awards, but also
punitive awards that have become increasingly disproportionate to actual damages. See,
e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (affirming a $10
million punitive award, which was 526 times actual damages).
The perceived abuse of punitive damages and continued growth in the size of individ-
ual awards has led to recurring appeals to the United States Supreme Court to address the
constitutional limits of punitive damages. See, e.g., id.; Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.
Ct. 2331, 2341-42 (1994) (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judi-
cial review of the size of punitive damage awards).
6 See, e.g., David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (reporting on then-Vice President Dan Quayle's proposals
for reforming the civil litigation system).
7 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 3 (arguing that repetitive punitive awards for a single
course of conduct could be unconstitutional as an excessive fine or in violation of due
process). Cf Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) (arguing
that punitive damages should not be allowed in asbestos litigation because repetitious
claims against the same defendant may violate due process and bankrupt the defendant,
making it impossible for future claimants to receive compensatory damages).
8 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ErAL., PRoSSER &KEETON ON THE LAw OFToRTs § 2, at 11
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing criticisms of punitive damages); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive
Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from Histoy, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1270
(1987); James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the Plain-
tiffi An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 1130, 1133 (1992); Note, An Economic Analysis of the
Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1900 (1992).
9 SeeJanie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage
Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REv. 61, 84-89 (1992) (comprehensively outlining
the limits that many states have placed on punitive damage awards).
10 This Note adopts the rather appropriate name for these statutes first appearing in
Recent Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1691 (1993).
11 Although split-recovery statutes are relatively new phenomena, the judiciary has
long recognized their theoreticaljustification. See, e.g., Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis.
654, 672 (1877) ("It is difficult on principle to see why, when the sufferer by a tort has been
fully compensated for his suffering he should recover anything more. And it is equally
difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they
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state's share to the state treasury, while others distribute it to special
funds created for the purpose of compensating accident or crime vic-
tims. By 1993, ten states had already enacted split-recovery statutes' 2
and the legislatures in four additional states were considering enact-
ing their own split-recovery regimes.' 3 In addition, the recent con-
gressional debates over health care reform included at least one
serious federal split-recovery proposal.
14
Split-recovery statutes have not gone unchallenged. Opponents
have attacked the statutes under the Takings and Excessive Fines
Clauses, 15 and the courts that have considered these challenges have
reached conflicting conclusions. Three state supreme courts have
held that their respective statutes are not unconstitutional under the
Takings Clause,' 6 while the Colorado high court has ruled that Colo-
rado's split-recovery statute works unconstitutional takings.' 7 The
courts have reached similarly conflicting results with respect to exces-
sive fines challenges. Three courts have held that the Excessive Fines
Clause does not apply to punitive damage awards under split-recovery
statutes,' 8 while a federal court in Georgia has declared the Georgia
statute unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.' 9
should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is
punished.").
12 Colorado; Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New York, Oregon,
Utah. See Shores, supra note 9, at 88-89; Andrew Blum, Three More Join Trend: States Want
Share ofPunitives, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 8, 1993, at 3, 35. The New York statute expired on April
1, 1994 under the law's sunset clause when the state legislature failed to reenact it before
that date. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & FL 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (historical and statutory
notes).
13 California, Indiana, NewJersey, Texas. See Blum, supra note 12, at 3, 35 (reporting
on the Indiana, New Jersey, and Texas bills); New Bills, RECORDER, Jan. 19, 1993, at 22
(California bill).
14 See Senate Mainstream Coalition's "Proposed Agreement" on Health Care Reform, Dated
Aug. 22, 1994, 1994 Daily Rep. For Exec. (BNA) No. 162, at d57 (Aug. 24, 1994). In an
apparent attempt both to reform the tort liability system and to find additional funding for
health care, the Senate Mainstream Coalition proposed requiring 75% of punitive damage
awards in health care malpractice actions to be paid to the state in which the action is
brought to fund licensing, disciplinary, and quality assurance programs. Id.
15 The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be... deprived of... property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, withoutjust
compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend. V. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16 See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1647 (1993); State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101
(1994); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); Shepherd Components,
Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
17 See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
Is See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (Iowa statute), rev'd
on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994); Spaur v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994) (Iowa statute); Tenold v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (Oregon statute).
19 See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
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This Note examines split-recovery statutes under the principles of
the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Part I outlines the split-recovery statutes that states have enacted in
efforts to control punitive damage awards, and explores the role that
the punitive remedy plays in American tort law. Part II discusses the
opinions of those courts that have considered how the Takings and
Excessive Fines Clauses relate to split-recovery statutes. Part III ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's current takings and excessive fines jurispru-
dence. It argues, first, that a split-recovery statute giving the state a
prejudgment interest in punitive damage awards does not constitute a
taking if it limits the plaintiff's interest to a portion of the punitive
award. Second, Part III contends that statutes giving the state a pre-
judgment interest in the award-those statutes least susceptible to tak-
ings challenges-are the very statutes to which the Excessive Fines
Clause is most likely to apply under the Supreme Court's most recent
excessive fines cases. Thus punitive damage awards in jurisdictions
having split-recovery statutes are likely to be subject to constitutional
review for excessiveness. Finally, Part III suggests that although a leg-
islature could draft a split-recovery statute that is not subject to the
limitations of the Takings or Excessive Fines Clauses, such an objective
is undesirable for policy reasons and poses serious practical
difficulties.
This Note concludes that properly drafted split-recovery statutes
are not only an obvious and appealing solution to the plaintiff-wind-
fall problem of punitive damages, but also an answer to the problem
of excessiveness. Since the Excessive Fines Clause limits the amount
of pecuniary punishment that the government can levy, it also should
limit punitive damage awards in cases where the government is an in-
tended beneficiary and the plaintiff sues on the government's behalf.
I
PuNrrIvE DAMAGE REFORM & THE STATUS OF PuNrrvE
DAMAGES IN AMERICAN LAw
The rapid expansion of tort litigation in the 1980s and the public
perception of abuse of the civil litigation system 20 led to calls for tort
reform, including limits on the availability of punitive damages.21 The
state legislatures and courts reacted by initiating various reform meas-
ures designed to restrict the availability or amount of punitive dam-
ages that litigants could receive. This Part first outlines state punitive
20 See Gastel, supra note 1 (reporting that a recent Insurance Information Institute
public opinion survey reveals that only 15% of Americans believe that more than half of
the lawsuits filed in the United States are justified, compared with 24% in 1984).
21 See, e.g., Margolick, supra note 6, at Al (reporting on then-Vice President Dan
Quayle's proposals for reforming the civil litigation system).
1994]
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damage reforms through split-recovery statutes. It then explores the
underlying tort policy supporting punitive damages and how that pol-
icy relates to split-recovery statutes.
A. State Reform of Punitive Damages: Split-Recovery Statutes
and Other Measures
States have pursued various types of punitive damage reform.
Some state legislatures 22 and state courts23 have outlawed punitive
damages altogether. Some have placed caps on all punitive damage
awards24 or punitive damage awards in certain types of actions. 25
Other states have limited the availability of punitive damages by in-
creasing the burden of proof to a "clear and convincing"26 or "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard.27 Still others have provided for a bifur-
cated trial procedure requiring the jury to determine punitive dam-
ages in a separate proceeding following the determination of
22 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1994); see also 2JAmEs D. GmARDi &
JoHNJ. KIRCHNER, PUNrrlvE DAMAGES LAw AND PaAcncE § 21.17 (Supp. 1989) (discussing
the legislative abolition of punitive damages in various states).
23 See, e.g., Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb.
1989); Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980) (Louisiana's general statutory provi-
sion on damages judicially construed to prohibit punitive damages), overruled in part by
Booze v. City of Alexandria, 637 So. 2d 91, 92 (La. 1994) (punitive damages are recover-
able in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit filed in a Louisiana state court).
24 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1) (a) (1987 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting pu-
nitive damages from exceeding the amount of compensatory damages awarded); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (limiting punitive awards to twice
compensatory damages); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.005 (1991) (capping punitive damage
awards at $300,000 in cases where compensatory damages are less than $100,000 and to
three times the amount of compensatory damages in cases where compensatory damages
exceed $100,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (Supp. 1993) (limiting punitive dam-
ages to the greater of twice compensatory damages or $200,000); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1995) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of four
times actual damages or $200,000); see also 2 GHIARDI & KiRcHNER, supra note 22, § 21.15
(discussing legislative limitations on the dollar amounts that plaintiffs can recover in puni-
tive damages litigation).
25 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(d) (Supp. 1993) (limiting punitive damages in
medical malpractice cases to the lesser of 25% of the defendant's highest gross annual
income during the five years preceding the wrongful act or $3 million) (determined to be
unconstitutional in Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan.
1988)); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1) (Supp. 1994) (limiting punitive damages
to one award against any one defendant for the same act or omission in products liability
cases) (upheld as constitutional under challenges that it violates equal protection in Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); held to violate equal protection in Mc-
Bride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990)).
26 See 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 22, § 21.13; Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform - State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1365, 1381 & nn.98-99
(1993) (reporting that 26 states have enacted a clear and convincing standard either by
statute or judicial decision).
27 Colorado is the only state that imposes a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard on
punitive damage claimants. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987 & Supp. 1994).
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compensatory damages.28 Finally, ten states have enacted split-recov-
ery statutes.29
This Note is concerned solely with split-recovery statutes. The ba-
sic premise of all split-recovery statutes is the same: the plaintiff must
share the defendant's punitive fine with the state. However, there is
some dispute over whether the split-recovery statutes in force in the
various states have achieved this goal. Some sources suggest that states
have collected little money under split-recovery statutes, either be-
cause the states simply have not enforced the statutes or because the
statutes fail to define clearly the mechanism through which the money
is to be transferred to the state.8 0 The evidence indicates, neverthe-
less, that the split-recovery statutes in several states have resulted in
substantial punitive funds making their way into public hands.31 For
28 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1995); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(7) (1993); see also 2 GHLARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 22, § 21.21 (discussing legislative
reforms requiring bifurcated trials to determine punitive damages). The rationale for bi-
furcation procedures is to prevent evidence which may be relevant only to the issue of
punitive damages, such as the net worth or profits of the defendant, from reaching the jury
during its calculation of compensatory damages. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 26, at
1382 & nn.104-105 (citing 2 AMsRIcAN LAw INsT., REPORTERS' STUDr ETERPRxSE REsPONSi-
BILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURy 255 n.41 (1991)).
29 See infra notes 33-51 and accompanying text. Judges are unlikely to achieve a split-
recovery result on their own absent an enabling statute. See Smith v. States Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992), where a trial judge awarded half of a $250,000 punitive
damage award to the Alabama affiliate of the American Heart Association. The Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that the allocation of half of the punitive damages to an entity other
than the plaintiff was inappropriate, holding that it infringed upon the jury's "constitu-
tional authority to determine what amount, if any, of punitive damages is necessary to
punish a defendant for wrongful conduct and to deter future conduct of a like nature." Id.
at 1025 (quoting Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1991)).
The Smith court focused on a trialjudge's lack of authority to reduce a plaintiff's valid
punitive damage award, and did not address the question whether the legislature has the
power to do so. 592 So. 2d at 1025. However, the Alabama Supreme Court did address
that question in a more recent case, indicating that it would probably hold any split-recov-
ery statute that the Alabama legislature might pass to be unconstitutional. See Henderson
v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 893-94 (Ala. 1993) (striking down an Alabama stat-
ute capping punitive damage awards at $250,000 under the state constitutional right to jury
trial).
30 See Blum, supra note 12, at 35 (quoting a 1992 survey by the American Tort Reform
Association noting that many states declined to enforce or did not have the funds to en-
force split-recovery allocation mechanisms); Sharon G. Burrows, Comment, Apportioning a
Piece of a Punitive Damage Award to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled with
Punitive Damage Goals and the Takings Clause, 47 U. MAmi L. REv. 437, 443 (1992) (noting
that "the manner in which the money is to be directed to the state fund is not clear in most
of these statutes"); Laura Duncan, Courts Not Sharing Punitive Awards with Disabled Under 7-
Year-Old Law, CHicAco DALv L. BuLL., Feb. 28, 1994, at 1 (suggesting that lack of aware-
ness and poor enforcement have caused the Illinois courts to award the state Department
of Rehabilitation Services part of a punitive recovery only once since the Illinois split-recoy-
ery statute went into effect in 1986).
31 See Blum, supra note 12, at 35 (noting that by early 1993 the Florida statute had
raised $627,373 since 1988 and that the New York law had raised as much as $75,000 since
its enactment in 1992).
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example, the Iowa Civil Reparations Trust Fund and the Oregon
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account stand to receive significant
sums as their respective shares of two recent punitive damage
awards.3
2
Beyond the basic premise of sharing punitive awards with the
public, the specific attributes of split-recovery statutes vary among the
states. The percentages of the "split," the types of actions in which the
statutes apply, and the destination of the state's share differ from state
to state.
1. Statutes Applying to All Punitive Damage Awards
The majority of state legislatures that have enacted split-recovery
statutes have made their laws applicable to all punitive damage
awards. The Colorado, Utah, and New York statutes fall within this
group, allocating their shares to their states' general revenue funds.33
Colorado claims a third of all punitive awards and Utah claims fifty
percent.3 4 New York claimed twenty percent of all punitive recoveries
prior to the expiration of its statute on April 1, 1994.35
Oregon and Missouri likewise have made their statutes applicable
to all punitive damage awards.3 6 Their statutes both deduct attorney
fees and expenses from punitive damages and split the remainder
32 See Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 864, 868-69 (Iowa
1994) (Civil Reparations Trust Fund to receive 75% of that portion of $1.5 million punitive
damage award against Owens-Coming remaining after payment of costs and fees); Tenold
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 415, 425-24 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account to receive one half of $1.5 million punitive award after deduction
of attorney fees).
In State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994), the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the State of Georgia's claim to $75 million as its share
under the Georgia split-recovery statute of a $101 million punitive damage award against
General Motors in a products liability action. Id. at 633-34; 77e Purpose of Punitive Damage,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 28, 1993, at F4. However, the state did not receive its $75
million share because the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the
Moseleys, including the punitive award, in the underlying products liability action for evi-
dentiary errors. See General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
Nevertheless, Georgia may yet share in a multimillion dollar punitive judgment in the Mose-
ley case, since the Moseleys will likely seek a new trial. See Bill Rankin, Couple Will Seek a New
Trial of GMSui4 ATLANTAJ. & CoNsT.,June 14, 1994, at DI.
33 COLO. REv. STAT. § 1--21-102(4) (1987 & Supp. 1994) (specifically disclaiming any
state interest in the punitive award prior to payment becoming due; held to be unconstitu-
tional under the Takings Clause in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo.
1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney
Supp. 1994) (expired April 1, 1994).
34 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
1(3) (1993) (50% of all punitive damages in excess of $20,000).
35 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (historical and statutory
notes) (statute expired by virtue of its sunset clause).
36 OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675(2)
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1994).
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evenly between the claimant and state-established victims' compensa-
tion funds.
37
The Florida statute, also applying to all punitive damage awards,
takes a variable approach on the destination of the state's share. It
allocates sixty-five percent of the award to the plaintiff, with the re-
maining thirty-five percent payable to a Public Medical Assistance
Trust Fund if the cause of action was based upon personal injury or
wrongful death.38 Otherwise, the remaining thirty-five percent goes
to the state's General Revenue Fund.3 9
In addition to these six states, the New Jersey,40 Indiana,41 Cali-
fomia,42 and Texas43 legislatures have considered enacting split-recov-
ery statutes that would apply to all punitive damage awards.
2. Statutes Applying to Punitive Damages in Only Certain Kinds of
Actions
Georgia's split-recovery statute applies only in products liability
cases.44 It deducts the prevailing party's litigation costs from the puni-
tive award and allocates seventy-five percent of the remainder to the
state's general fund.45
37 OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993) (awarding 50% of punitive dam-
ages after deduction of attorney fees to the state Criminal Injuries Compensation Account,
unless the prevailing party is a public entity, in which case the prevailing party keeps
100%); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675(2) (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1994) (awarding 50% of puni-
tive damages after deduction of attorney fees and expenses to the state Tort Victims' Com-
pensation Fund).
The Court of Appeals of Oregon has ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to punitive damages awarded under the Oregon statute. See Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 873 P.2d 413 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
38 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1995).
39 Id. The Florida Supreme Court has upheld Florida's statute under a takings chal-
lenge. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (upholding the 60%
state-40% plaintiff split that ch. 768.73(2) had mandated before it was amended to its pres-
ent form in 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
40 See Russ Bleemer, Limiting Damages Again, N.J. L.J., Feb. 15, 1993, at 6 (would allo-
cate 75% of punitive awards to a state run trust fund to help pay for the care of indigent
hospital patients); Blum, supra note 12, at 3.
41 See Blum, supra note 12, at 3 (would allocate 75% of punitives to the state Victim
and Witness Assistance Program).
42 See New Bills, supra note 13, at 22 (would make 90% of punitive damage awards
payable to the state Victim-Witness Assistance Fund).
43 See Blum, supra note 12, at 3 (would allocate 50% of punitive awards to the state
treasury).
44 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1994).
45 Id. The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's law
under both takings and equal protection challenges. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436
S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (takings and equal protection challenges); State v. Moseley, 436
S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994) (takings challenge). But see Mc-
Bride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding the Georgia




The Kansas statute applies only to medical malpractice actions.46
It requires plaintiffs in those actions to share fifty percent of punitive
damages with a state-created health care stabilization fund.
47
3. Statutes Taking an Intermediate Approach: A Special Duty to the
Plaintiff?
Iowa's statute applies to all punitive damages, but allocates sev-
enty-five percent of the punitive damage award to a civil reparations
trust fund only in cases where the defendant's outrageous conduct
was not directed specifically at the claimant.48 Otherwise, the claim-
ant keeps the entire punitive damage award.
49
The Illinois statute gives the court discretion to decide whether to
apportion punitive damages among the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attor-
ney and the State of Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services.50
However, in deciding whether to apportion punitives, judges must
consider whether the defendant owed a special duty to the plaintiff.51
B. The Role of Punitive Damages in Tort Law: Split-Recovery
Statutes as Consistent with Tort Goals
1. The Purpose of Punitive Damages
The distinction between compensatory and punitive damages is
clear in the law. Compensatory damages are that measure of recovery
necessary to return the plaintiff to the plaintiffs preinjury condi-
tion.52 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are not intended to
compensate the plaintiff for injury. Instead, punitive damages gener-
ally serve the goals of punishment and deterrence.53 This clear dis-
46 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(a), (e) (Supp. 1992).
47 Id. § 60-3402(e).
48 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (2) (b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
49 Id. § 668A.1 (2) (a). The Supreme Court of Iowa and a federal district court have
upheld Iowa's statute against takings and excessive fines challenges. See Burke v. Deere &
Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (Excessive Fines Clause not applicable), rev'd an
othergrounds, 6 F.Sd 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994); Spaur v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994) (same); Shepherd Components,
Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991) (no taking).
50 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994).
51 Id. The requirement in Illinois' statute that the trial judge consider whether the
defendant owed a special duty to the plaintiff appears to reflect the normative judgment
also implicit in the Iowa statute, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text, that the
plaintiff should receive the entire punitive award where the outrageous conduct was di-
rected specifically at the plaintiff, rather than at society as a whole. Cf infra notes 64-71
and accompanying text (discussing the plaintiff's windfall from punitive damages
litigation).
52 JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. & RicHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTs PROcESS 201 (3d ed.
1988); see also BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990) ("Compensatory damages are
such as will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more.").
-5 See GHtARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 22, §§ 2.01, 18.08; James D. Ghiardi, Punitive
Damages: State Extraction Practice Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J.
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tinction between the purposes of compensatory and punitive damages
is entrenched in state tort law. The vast majority of states recognize
punishment and deterrence as the exclusive purposes of punitive
damages.
54
This emphasis on deterrence and punishment is consistent with
the type of conduct required to sustain a claim for punitive damages.
Although definitions differ from state to state, incorporating such
terms as "outrageous" or "malicious" behavior, states generally allow
punitive damages for only two types of conduct.55 The defendant
must either intend to cause harm, or act recklessly or in conscious
disregard of the probability of causing harm.5
6
Moreover, the retributive and deterrent purposes of punitive
damages make them very similar to criminal fines.57 Indeed, it is in
this sense that punitive damages serve useful social goals. First, they
are "necessary as a civil form of punishment because they serve as a
method of punishing behavior that society condemns, but which is
not punishable in the criminal system."58 In-addition, "[p]unitive
damages can be a useful tool for deterring the wrongdoer and others
119, 121 (1990); Shores, supra note 9, at 69-70; Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, TheFeasibil-
ity of Full State Extraction of Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 301,303 (1994); see also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (characterizing punitive damages as
"private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) cmt. a (1977) ("The purposes of
awarding punitive damages... are to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to
discourage him and others from similar conduct in the future.").
54 See, e.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989); Hawkins v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874 (1987); Adams v.
Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Cal. 1991); White v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Colo.
1992); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 529 & n.7 (Del. 1987); Stone Man, Inc. v.
Green, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. 1993); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 570
(Haw. 1989); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. 1990); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 983 (Ind. 1993); Godbersen v.
Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Iowa 1989); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan. 1993);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 650 (Md. 1992); Rosenbloom v. Flygare, 501
N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. 1993); Carpenter v. Chrysler Corp., 853 S.W.2d 346, 366 (Mo.
1993); Dees v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 861 P.2d 141, 150 (Mont. 1993); Folz v. State,
797 P.2d 246, 261 (N.M. 1990) (MontgomeryJ., specially concurring); Walker v. Sheldon,
179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961); Detling v. Chockey, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Ohio 1982);
Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1990); Kirkbride v. Lisbon
Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1989); Huffman v. Love, 427 S.E.2d 357, 361 (Va.
1993); Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 155 N.W.2d 619, 631 (Wis. 1968); Sheridan Commercial
Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 817 (Wyo. 1993). But see Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d
470, 474 (Tex. 1984) (punitive damages serve not only to punish and deter, but also to
compensate the plaintiff for inconvenience and attorney fees and to reimburse the plaintiff
for losses too remote to be considered as compensation).
55 See 1 GHARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 22, §§ 5.01, 5.04.
56 Id. § 5.04.
-57 See Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 121.
58 Shores, supra note 9, at 70.
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who are similarly situated from engaging in intentional or willful con-
duct that may injure others."59
One commentator argues, nevertheless, that punitive damages
serve to compensate the injured party for litigation-related expenses
and mental anguish caused by the outrageous nature of the defen-
dant's actions.60 This argument not only cuts against the well-estab-
lished doctrine of punitive damages in the vast majority of states,6 ' but
overlooks more equitable solutions to these problems as well. For ex-
ample, a system of reimbursing the litigation costs of all prevailing
parties would be less arbitrary than merely allowing plaintiffs who pre-
vail on punitive damage claims to receive compensation for litigation
costs. 62 In addition, correctly assessing the level of damages necessary
to compensate the plaintiff fully would be a more equitable solution
to problems of undercompensation than relying on an extraordinary
punitive measure.
63
2. The Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation and the
Split-Recovery Solution
As a corollary to the generally recognized view that punitive dam-
ages do not serve to compensate, legal scholars have long recognized
that plaintiffs reap a windfall from punitive awards and that such
awards should thus be shared with the public. In Smith v. Wade, for
example, Justice Rehnquist noted that
[p] unitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who
are entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries-but no
more. Even assuming that a punitive "fine" should be imposed after
civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the plaintiff-
who by hypothesis is fully compensated. 64
Like Rehnquist, other authorities recognize that plaintiffs do not have
a personal right to punitive damages.65 Rather, punitive damages are
more similar to a public good than a private right because they serve
the dual public goals of punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, pu-
nitive recoveries should be rewarded to the general public, not private
plaintiffs.66
59 Id. at 69.
60 See Burrows, supra note 30, at 447.
61 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
62 See Breslo, supra note 8, at 1136.
63 Id. at 1138.
64 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990) ("An
individual does not.., have a vested right in the common-law rules governing negligence
actions."); Shores, supra note 9, at 91 ("[P]laintiff[s] [have] no constitutional right to puni-
tive damages.") (citation omitted).
66 See Massey, supra note 8, at 1270.
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One commentator has argued that windfalls resulting from puni-
tive damages lead to economic inefficiencies. 67 Determining that the
amount of the economic windfall is that amount by which punitive
damages exceed the plaintiff's litigation costs, 68 this commentator
concludes that punitive damage windfalls provide inefficient compen-
sation, encourage plaintiffs to engage in inefficient risk-seeking behav-
ior, and misallocate legal resources. 6
9
Thus, the windfalls from punitive damage awards distort the tort
system by offering plaintiffs potentially greater recoveries than they
need to be fully compensated for the losses they have suffered. Soci-
ety may be injured by actions that form the basis of a claim for puni-
tive damages.70 Yet, plaintiffs and their attorneys seek to keep the
entire punitive "fine" for themselves. This may not only be inequita-
ble where the punitive award is more than enough to compensate the
plaintiff for inconvenience and for bringing the punitive claim, but
may also lead to overly aggressive plaintiff behavior.7 1
Confronted with similar criticisms, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System pro-
posed a compromise solution to the plaintiff-windfall problem in
1987: "After deducting costs and expenses, the court should deter-
The characterization of punitive awards as a public good suggests that the state should
keep the entire judgment for itself. However, allowing the private plaintiff to receive some
portion of punitives better serves the public interest. The state should encourage litigants
to play the role of private attorney general in pursuing the punishment and deterrence of
dangerous tortfeasors. Split-recovery statutes achieve this desirable result, but also limit
the extent of socially undesirable windfall recoveries by plaintiffs.
The burden rests on the legislature to wisely craft split-recovery laws that give the
plaintiff enough of the punitive award to provide an adequate incentive for pursuing puni-
tive claims while simultaneously not granting the plaintiff a greater windfall than is neces-
sary to serve this incentive function. For example, one way to ensure that the state will not
deter plaintiffs from bringing small but socially desirable punitive claims is to make only
that portion of punitive awards in excess of some minimum amount subject to the state's
share. See, eg., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (allowing plaintiffs to keep the entire
punitive award up to $20,000 and giving the state 50% of punitive damages in excess of
that amount).
67 See Note, supra note 8, at 1907-08.
68 1& at 1906.
69 Rd at 1907-10.
70 See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (noting that
the public is usually at risk of harm in product liability cases).
Although the public's claim to a punitive award is greatest where the actions that gave
rise to that award are indiscriminately directed at society as a whole, the public neverthe-
less has a valid claim even where the actions are directed at only one person. In the crimi-
nal context, crimes are no less crimes against societyjust because they are directed at one
individual. Similarly, in the context of punitive damages, the public has a claim to the
punitive debt that the malicious tortfeasor owes to society as a result of outrageous acts
against some of its members.
71 See E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. Rrv.
839, 851 n.63 (1993) (citing sources arguing that the potential for a punitive award may
lead to overly aggressive plaintiffs and overdeterrence of tortfeasors).
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mine what is a reasonable portion of the punitive damages award to
compensate the plaintiff and counsel for bringing the action and
prosecuting the punitive damages claim, with the balance of that
award allocated to public purposes."7 2 This proposal acted as an invi-
tation to state legislatures, many of which enacted split-recovery stat-
utes in the late 1980s.
73
3. Preserving the Optimal Retributive and Deterrent Value of Punitive
Damages
Split-recovery statutes are consistent with the goals and policies of
tort law.74 These laws address the plaintiff-windfall problem 75 without
eliminating or restricting the deterrent and punishment value of pu-
nitive damages. Consequently, they are a solution that ameliorates
the plaintiff-windfall problem more efficiently than other punitive
damage reform measures. 76
72 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT
LIABILITY SysTsM 19 (1987).
7-3 The ABA proposal suggested that the courts should determine how the punitive
award should be allocated. Only Illinois enacted a statute leaving the allocation to court
discretion. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992). Janie Shores, a
Justice on the Alabama Supreme Court, argues that the ideal split-recovery arrangement is
one that leaves the determination of how to allocate punitive damages to court discretion.
See Shores, supra note 9, at 62. Schwartz and Behrens, on the other hand, contend that
legislatures are in a much better position to carry out tort reform. See Schwartz & Behrens,
supra note 26, at 1373-74. That all states, except Illinois, which have enacted split-recovery
statutes have not left the allocation of the punitive award to court discretion, despite the
ABA proposal, indicates that legislators may find the ABA proposal to be an unworkable
and unenforceable solution. State legislators, it appears, do not wish to rely upon the
flexible discretion of trial judges to carry out the allocation of punitives between plaintiffs
and the state. Thus, it appears that the majority of state legislators have sided with
Schwartz and Behrens.
74 See Grube, supra note 71, at 841-55 (arguing that there is no good policy reason why
punitive damages should go to the plaintiff); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute:
A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL- U. L. REV. 473, 490
(1993) (noting that split-recovery statutes maintain the beneficial retributive function of
punitive damages while eliminating plaintiffs' windfalls); Note, supra note 8, at 1900 (argu-
ing that punitive awards are a windfall to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff therefore
should not be allowed to keep the entire punitive award). But see Burrows, supra note 30, at
443-50 (arguing that split-recovery statutes do not promote the goals or purposes of puni-
tive damages).
75 But see Grube, supra note 71, at 862 (arguing that a split-recovery system does not
totally eliminate the plaintiffs windfall and proposing an alternative system in which the
plaintiff receives none of the punitive award, but the plaintiffs attorney is compensated).
76 There is, of course, another obvious solution to the plaintiff-windfall problem that
would leave the punishment and deterrent value of punitive damages intact. A state legis-
lature might levy a special tax on all punitive awards to eliminate the' plaintiffs windfall
without curtailing the availability of the punitive sanction. This taxation solution, however,
is inferior to the split-recovery solution because a special tax would be more susceptible to
challenges under the Takings Clause than a split-recovery statute.
Although states "have broad powers to impose and collect taxes," Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989), the Constitution restricts their
taxing power. State attempts to accomplish indirectly through a selective tax those func-
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For example, a system in which plaintiffs share punitive awards
with the general public is more efficient than one in which the legisla-
ture simply caps all punitive damage awards. As Judge Shores argues,
"Capping punitive awards at a specific monetary limit is an inefficient
way to deter harmful conduct, because each defendant's economic
situation is different.... To operate efficiently, the civil justice system
must be particularized to specific defendants. A legislative cap may
tions that they could not achieve through direct regulation are subject to constitutional
challenge. See Richard A. Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent 102 HA.v. L. REv. 4, 74-79, 94-96 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court cases
considering the validity of selective tax-exemptions affecting First Amendment rights, and
arguing that the taxation schemes were invalid under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine). States may not impose a tax that is "a mere disguise [for exercising], in reality,
another and different power denied by the Federal Constitution," Magnano Co. v. Hamil-
ton, 292 U.S. 40, 45 (1934). Although the courts do not often invalidate taxes as unconsti-
tutional, the Constitution limits the taxing power of the states if a tax is "so arbitrary as to
compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but consti-
tutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as,
for example, the confiscation of property." Id. at 44; see Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 n.17 (1981); Estate of Renick v. United States, 687 F.2d 371,
375 (Ct. Cl. 1982); cf. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)
("[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of
this tribunal... to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.").
Thus, the Supreme Court has invalidated taxes where a legislature attempted by
means of taxation to regulate beyond the scope of its constitutional powers. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding the Child
Labor Tax Law, which imposed a 10% tax on the net income of employers of child labor,
invalid under the Tenth Amendment as a mere attempt to regulate the employment of
child labor-a matter reserved to state law); cf. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221 (1987) (exemption from state general sales tax for magazines and newspapers
containing certain subject matter invalid under First Amendment freedom of the press);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (state scheme conditioning property tax exemp-
tions on oaths of loyalty to the United States unconstitutional under First Amendment
freedom of speech). But see BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denial
of charitable tax exemption to private university that banned interracial dating and mar-
riage among students for religious reasons not unconstitutional under First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause).
Consistent with this precedent, the Supreme Court would probably analyze a state tax
levied exclusively on punitive damage awards as a mere regulation of punitive damages.
Thus, the tax would not be insulated from challenges that it worked an unconstitutional
taking in regulating punitive awards.
Accordingly, the tax would be less likely to withstand a takings challenge than a prop-
erly drafted split-recovery statute. Since the tax could only apply to the postjudgment
punitive award, it would encounter the same takings problem faced by split-recovery stat-
utes that deprive the state of any prejudgment interest in the inchoate punitive award. See
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); infra part III.A.3. By contrast,
split-recovery statutes drafted to give the state a prejudgment interest in the inchoate puni-
tive award are less subject to a takings challenge since they limit the plaintiff's property
interest in the punitive judgment. See infra part II.A.3. Consequently, the taxation solu-
tion is less desirable from the viewpoint of a legislator concerned with the problems of
punitive damages, since a court is more likely to find a special tax facially unconstitutional
under the Takings Clause.
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over-deter some and under-deter others."77 Unlike a system of caps
on punitive damages, a split-recovery regime allows the jury to deter
each defendant to the extent it deems appropriate.
A split-recovery system is also more efficient than one in which
punitive damages are outlawed. While eliminating the punitive sanc-
tion is a solution to the inefficiencies of the plaintiff-windfall problem,
it creates new inefficiencies of equal or greater magnitude by also
eliminating the retributive and deterrent effect of punitive damages.
78
In a system lacking punitive damages, defendants will not experience
optimal levels of punishment and deterrence and, accordingly, will
not curb their outrageous behavior to socially efficient levels.
79
Finally, a split-recovery system, while not directly restricting the
amount of punitive awards, offers incidental benefits to defendants
since "it reduces the artificially high incentives of some plaintiffs to
sue."80 Thus, split-recovery statutes serve the overriding policies of pu-
nitive damages-retribution and deterrence-and ameliorate one of
the biggest dilemmas of the current punitive damages system-the
plaintiff-windfall problem. In addition, as the cases in the following
Part illustrate, a split-recovery regime may solve another pressing
problem of the current punitive damages regime-the problem of ex-
cessive punitive sanctions.8 '
77 Shores, supra note 9, at 87.
78 See Note, supra note 8, at 1914. For similar reasons, a split-recovery regime is also a
better reform measure than one which gives the entire punitive award to the state. Split-
recovery statutes encourage plaintiffs to prosecute punitive claims against dangerous
tortfeasors by allowing the plaintiff to keep a portion of the punitive award. A system in
which the state receives 100% of punitive awards would discourage plaintiffs from bringing
punitive claims, allowing some outrageous defendant behavior to go unpunished unless
the state itself prosecuted punitive actions. Cf. supra note 66.
79 See Note, supra note 8, at 1914. Calculating the optimal level of retribution and
deterrence, of course, presupposes a workable method for computing wealth maximiza-
tion. Nevertheless, a completely accurate method for calculating the most efficient level is
not necessary to conclude that a split-recovery regime is more efficient than the traditional
system of punitive damages. A system that leaves the punitive remedy intact but also limits
the excessiveness of punitive awards will more closely approximate optimal levels of pun-
ishment and deterrence than one that eliminates punitive damages altogether. In the lat-
ter regime defendants would theoretically pay the same amount of damages for any
specific injury they caused regardless of how reckless and potentially dangerous their ac-
tions were.
80 Id. at 1912.
81 Excessive punitive awards are also inefficient. If an award is excessive, it will over
punish and over deter the defendant, very likely leading to social inefficiencies as the de-
fendant and potential defendants become overly cautious.
As the cases in part II.B, infra, indicate, and this Note in part III.B.2, infra, argues,
punitive damages in a split-recovery system are subject to the constitutional limitations of
the Excessive Fines Clause. Since plaintiffs in such a system bring punitive actions on be-
half of the state, and the state shares in the punitive award, the punitive remedy meets the
Supreme Court's definition of sanctions that are subject to constitutional review for exces-




THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPLIT-RECOVERY
STATUTES UNDER THE TAKINGS & ExcEsswE FINES
CLAUSES-THE CASES
As one commentator has suggested, "split-recovery statutes face
two horns of a constitutional dilemma." 2 Plaintiffs and defendants
each have one primary constitutional "horn" with which to attack
these laws. Plaintiffs-those having to share their punitive awards
with the state-generally challenge the facial constitutionality of the
statutes under the Takings Clause. 3 On the other hand, defend-
ants-those having to pay the punitive awards-argue that the statutes
subject punitive damage recoveries to constitutional limits on exces-
siveness under the Excessive Fines Clause.
8 4
The cases in this Part illustrate the interplay and interaction of
the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses in split-recovery regimes.
The drafting of the statutes, specifically the extent of the state's pre-
judgment interest in the punitive award, influences the courts' takings
and excessive fines analyses. The cases illustrate an intriguing rela-
tionship between the two clauses. Drafting to give the state a prejudg-
ment interest in the inchoate punitive award avoids takings problems,
but may open the door to excessive fines challenges. Drafting to de-
prive the state of any prejudgment interest, on the other hand, leads
to takings challenges but no excessive fines problem.
A. Takings Challenges to Split-Recovery Statutes
1. Punitive Damages as a Public Good, Not a Private Right: State
Courts Upholding Split-Recovery Statutes
The Supreme Court of Georgia recently upheld that state's split-
recovery statute85 under takings challenges in two companion cases,
82 Recent Cases, supra note 10, at 1694.
83 See, e.g., State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101
(1994); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); Gordon v. State, 608 So.
2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1647 (1993); Kirkv. Denver Publish-
ing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue
& Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991). But see McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737
F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (declaratory judgment action; tort claimant challenged
split-recovery statute on excessive fines, equal protection, and due process grounds); Mack
Trucks, supra (challenging Georgia's statute under the Equal Protection Clause). The
equal protection challenge of Mack Trucks is not representative of most split-recovery stat-
utes, however, since Georgia's statute is unusual in that it applies only in products liability
actions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1) (Supp. 1994).
84 See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on othergrounds,
6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994); Spaur v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413
(Or. Ct. App. 1994).
85 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1994).
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Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle86 and State v. Moseley.87 The court outlined
its reasoning on the issue in Mack Trucks, stressing the claimant's lack
of a vested property right in a punitive award and the public's corre-
sponding interest in punitive damage recoveries.
8
Mack Trucks involved a tort plaintiffs products liability claims
against a truck manufacturer.8 9 The jury awarded $184,082 in com-
pensatory damages and two million dollars in punitive damages. 90 As
part of the judgment, the trial court declared Georgia's split-recovery
statute unconstitutional, and the state appealed.91
The Georgia Supreme Court began its takings analysis with the
premise that plaintiffs have no vested property right in an award of
punitive damages.92 To the contrary, under Georgia law punitive
damages serve the public purpose of punishing and deterring the de-
fendant, not the private purpose of providing a windfall to the individ-
ual plaintiff.98 The court emphasized the public nature of punitive
awards:
As the risk and harm are distributed between the individual plaintiff
and all citizens of Georgia, the legislature has seen fit to distribute a
portion of the damages awarded to those at potential risk-all citi-
zens of the state.... [T] here is no compelling reason to allow the
86 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
87 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994). Moseley involved a
products liability action against General Motors in which the jury awarded $101 million in
punitive damages to the plaintiffs. 436 S.E.2d at 633. The trial court held that Georgia's
split-recovery statute violated the Takings Clause, and the state appealed. Id. at 633-34. On
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the state of Georgia could consti-
tutionally apportion 75% of the punitive recovery to the state's general revenue fund. Id.
at 634. However, the state did not receive its $75 million share because the Georgia Court
of Appeals subsequently reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, including the
punitive award, in the underlying products liability action for evidentiary errors. See Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
88 See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638-39. The plaintiff in Mack Trucks also challenged
the Georgia split-recovery statute, which applies only in products liability actions, see GA.
CODE. ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1) (Supp. 1994), under the Equal Protection Clause. The Geor-
gia Supreme Court, upholding the statute, discussed the differences between plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages in products liability actions and those seeking punitive damages
in other kinds of tort actions. 436 S.E.2d at 639. The court noted that products liability
torts harm society as a whole, while torts where the defendant acted with specific intent to
harm the plaintiff place only the plaintiff at risk. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the
statute does not violate equal protection, because plaintiffs seeking punitive damages in
products liability actions and those seeking punitives in other actions are not similarly situ-
ated. Id.
89 See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 636.
90 Id. at 637.
91 Id.




only plaintiff permitted to litigate the punitive damages issue in
court to retain all [of] the punitive damages award .... 94
Thus, the court concluded that the legislature may lawfully regulate
punitive damages awards, including apportioning a percentage to the
state, without violating the Takings Clause.95
Like the Georgia court, the Florida Supreme Court has upheld
Florida's split-recovery statute96 against a tort plaintiff's takings chal-
lenges. Gordon v. Stat9 7 involved a claim for damages for false impris-
onment and battery in which the plaintiff received $72,500 in
compensatory damages and $512,600 in punitive damages.98 After en-
try of final judgment, the State of Florida intervened to assert its sixty
percent interest in the punitive damages award.99 The plaintiff ob-
jected that the statute was unconstitutional under the Takings Clause.
On appeal, the Florida high court, like the Mack Trucks court, ad-
dressed the nature of the plaintiff's property right in a claim for puni-
tive damages as well as the public's interest in punitive damage
recoveries.
The court placed great emphasis on the nature of a plaintiff's
property interest in punitive damages and the legislature's authority
to regulate punitive awards. It reasoned that plaintiffs had
no cognizable, protectable right to the recovery of punitive damages
at all. Unlike the right to compensatory damages, the allowance of
punitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public
policy. Accordingly, it is clear that the very existence of an inchoate
claim for punitive damages is subject to the plenary authority of the
ultimate policy-maker under our system, the legislature. In the ex-
94 Id. at 639. Under the court's reasoning, this statement applies especially to puni-
tive damages in products liability cases, but not where the defendant acted with specific
intent to harm the plaintiff. Id. The court developed this explanation to defend Georgia's
split-recovery statute, which applies only in products liability cases, against an equal protec-
tion challenge. However, the Iowa and Illinois legislatures apparently followed similar rea-
soning in drafting their split-recovery statutes, which take into account whether the
defendant owed a special duty to the plaintiff in allocating a portion of punitive damages
to the state. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
95 See Mack Trcks, 436 S.E.2d at 639. The drafting of the Georgia statute supports the
court's interpretation of its constitutionality under the Takings Clause. The statute gives
the state of Georgia all the rights of a judgment creditor upon entry ofjudgment, see GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1994), supporting the view that the claimant never has
a property right in the entire punitive award. Cf. discussion of Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co.,
infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
96 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1995).
97 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
98 Id. at 801.
99 Id. The Florida legislature amended § 768.73(2) in 1992 to reduce the state's inter-
est in punitive damage awards to 35%. See supra note 39.
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ercise of that discretion, it may place conditions upon such a recov-
ery or even abolish it altogether.
100
Thus, the court concluded that plaintiffs have no prejudgment vested
right in any claim to punitive damages and that the split-recovery ar-
rangement had therefore not impaired any property right of the
plaintiff. 101
The Gordon court went on to identify the legislative objectives of
the split-recovery statute: "to allot to the public weal a portion of dam-
ages designed to deter future harm to the public and to discourage
punitive damage claims by making them less remunerative to the
claimant and the claimant's attorney."102 Thus, the court recognized
that punitive damages are a public good, and that it is in the public's
interest not to give plaintiffs too great an incentive to sue for punitive
damages.
The Iowa Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of that
state's split-recovery statute under the Takings Clause as well. In Shep-
herd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 10 3 the plaintiff
sued a contractor and an engineering firm after excavation work they
were undertaking on property adjacent to the plaintiffs led to the
collapse of a wall of the plaintiff's cinder block building. 04 The trial
court entered judgment against the contractor for punitive damages
and allocated seventy-five percent of the punitive award, excluding at-
torney fees, to the state civil reparation trust fund pursuant to the
Iowa split-recovery statute. 10 5 The plaintiff appealed the allocation,
asserting that the statute effected an unconstitutional taking of his
property.10 6
Taking a position similar to that of the Mack Trucks and Gordon
courts, the Iowa court noted that "punitive damages are not allowed as
a matter of right and are discretionary .... [P]unitive damages are
not intended to be compensatory and ... a plaintiff is a fortuitous
beneficiary of a punitive damage award simply because there is no one
else to receive it."107 Accordingly, the court concluded that the alloca-
tion of punitive damages to the state was not unconstitutional because
100 Cordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (quoting Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-36 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted)).
101 Id. at 801-02.
102 Id. at 802.
103 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
104 Id. at 614.
105 Id.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (2) (b) (West 1987).
106 See Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 614, 619. The plaintiff also asserted that the
Iowa law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 619. The court,
however, did not address these additional arguments. Id.
107 Id. (citations omitted).
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the plaintiff had no vested property right in the punitive award before
the entry of judgment.108
2. A Private Right to Punitives and Statutory Disavowals: Kirk v.
Denver Publishing Co.'a 9
The Supreme Court of Colorado reached a different conclusion.
It ruled that Colorado's split-recovery statute" ° was unconstitutional,
because it effected a taking of private property without just
compensation."'
In Kirk, a newspaper publisher sued its distributor for the balance
allegedly owed on a contract.1 2 The distributor counterclaimed, later
adding a claim for malicious prosecution."8 The distributor eventu-
ally received ajudgment of $118,980 in punitive damages on the mali-
cious prosecution claim, and filed a post-trial motion challenging the
constitutionality of the Colorado split-recovery statute requiring claim-
ants to pay a third of punitive damage judgments to the state general
fund."
4
The Kirk court noted that a punitive damages judgment is a prop-
erty interest under Colorado law." 5 It then reviewed the Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudence and concluded that a governmental ap-
propriation of a significant part of a money judgment can withstand a
takings challenge only if it bears "a reasonable relationship to the gov-
ernmental services provided to civil litigants in making use of thejudi-
108 Id.
109 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
110 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987).
M Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273.
112 Id. at 264.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 267. The best interpretation of the Kirk court's ruling is not that a plaintiff
has a right to an inchoate award of punitive damages under Colorado law, but that a plain-
tiff has a right to receive the entire amount of the judgment that ajudge has entered in the
plaintiff's favor. The Colorado split-recovery statute disavows any prejudgment state inter-
est in the punitive action. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987). In ana-
lyzing the statute's effect, the court noted that it "contemplates the entry, and the actual
collection, of a final judgment" before the state receives its one-third interest. 818 P.2d at
266. Thus, the Kirk court's characterization of a punitive damages judgment as a property
interest appears more strongly to support the proposition that all finaljudgments are prop-
erty than the proposition that an inchoate award of punitive damages is a property interest
to which a plaintiff has a vested claim.
At any rate, Kirk's recognition of the property interest under Colorado law reflects a
fundamental aspect of any takings analysis of punitive awards-courts must look to state
law to determine whether a punitive award qualifies as a property interest. While federal
law may control the application of the principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, state law creates and defines the property interest that is the subject of constitu-
tional review. See infra part III.A.1 & 3. Consequently, a reviewing court's analysis of any




cial process for the purpose of resolving the civil claim resulting in the
judgment."116 The court found that one-third of the punitive award,
which the state sought to collect under the split-recovery statute, was
grossly disproportionate to any services that the government had
made available to the claimant in using the courts.117
The Kirk court, however, did not base its decision on this ground
alone. The Colorado split-recovery statute provides that the state has
no interest in the claim for punitive damages at any time before the
judgment becomes payable.11 8 The court found this "statutory disa-
vowal ... of any state interest" before collection to indicate that the
statute in this case effected unconstitutional takings, since the disa-
vowal was "an implicit legislative acknowledgement of the property in-
terest" that the claimant has in the judgment.1 9
Thus, a factor distinguishing the result reached in Kirk was the
drafting of the Colorado split-recovery statute, which disclaimed any
prejudgment government interest in the punitive award. The result
might have been different in Kirk had the statute not included this
provision. As the majority noted, "[the legislature may well abate or
diminish a pending civil action, but when that claim ripens into judg-
ment 'the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created
thereby ceases.' "120 Consequently, the distinguishing factor in Kirk is
that the state sought to take what had already matured into a full
property interest. 121
116 Kirk, 818 P.2d at 270.
117 Id. at 273.
118 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987) ("Nothing in this subsection
(4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary
damages... at any time prior to payment becoming due.") (emphasis added).
119 Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267, 273. The Kirk court also found the lack of any nexus between
the government interest in punishing and deterring outrageous tortious conduct and the
allocation to the state of a portion of the injured person's punitive award to indicate that
the statute effected unconstitutional takings. Id. at 273. The court, however, overlooked
the fact that the plaintiff had already been fully compensated by the award of compensa-
tory damages. It appears to have viewed punitive damages as something to which the plain-
tiff is entitled, rather than a public good. Had it interpreted punitive damages as most
authorities do, as private fines designed to punish the wrongdoer and protect society from
similar outrageous conduct in the future, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text, it
would be difficult to understand why it found no nexus between the public interest served
by punitive damages and the allocation of part of the punitive fine to the state.
120 Kirk, 818 P.2d at 272 (quoting McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24
(1898)).
121 See Note, supra note 8, at 1916 (arguing that the constitutional infirmity in the
Colorado statute could be overcome by altering the statutory language); see also infra part
III.A.3 (discussing how a split-recovery statute should be drafted to avoid constitutional
infirmity under the Takings Clause).
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B. Split-Recovery Statutes and the Excessive Fines Clause
1. The Supreme Court's Position: Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.
122
In Browning-Fernis the United States Supreme Court was presented
with the question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment 123 applies to punitive damages. The Court reviewed the
history and origins of the Excessive Fines Clause 12 4 and held that the
Clause does not restrict the size of punitive sanctions in civil suits
"when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any
right to receive a share of the damages awarded."12 5 The Court rea-
soned that the historical purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause were
to place limits on the power of the sovereign. This concern is not
present in cases where only private parties receive punitive damages
from other parties and the government receives no share of the puni-
tive sanction. 12 6 However, the majority explicitly left open "the ques-
tion whether a qui tam action, in which a private party brings suit in
the name of the [government] and shares in any award of damages,
would implicate the [Excessive Fines] Clause."
12 7
Accordingly, the Browning-Ferris decision opened the debate on
whether the Excessive Fines Clause limits the size of punitive damage
awards in jurisdictions where the state shares in those judgments by
virtue of a split-recovery statute. As Justice O'Connor observed in
Browning-Ferris, "[B]y relying so heavily on the distinction between gov-
ernmental involvement and purely private suits, the Court suggests...
that the Excessive Fines Clause will place some limits on awards of
punitive damages that are recovered by a governmental entity."128
The following cases analyze split-recovery statutes in light of Browning-
Ferris.129
122 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
123 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
124 See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264-73.
125 Id. at 263-64.
126 Id. at 271-72.
127 Id. at 275 n.21. A lower federal court has recently answered this question in the
affirmative, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to limit damages in qui tam
actions under the Federal False Claims Act. See United States ex reL Smith v. Gilbert Realty
Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 72-73 (E.D. Mich. 1993); infra part III.B.2.
128 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298-99 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Florida's split-recovery statute as an example).
129 The Supreme Court again left open the question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause applies in qui tam actions in a more recent case. See Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2804 n.3 (1993). Austin makes the argument for applying the Excessive Fines
Clause to split-recovery punitive awards more compelling, since it holds that the Clause
may apply in civil cases where the government exercises its power to punish. Id. at 2805-06.
Ruling on the applicability of the Clause to civil forfeitures, the Court held that "the ques-
tion is not.., whether forfeiture. . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punish-
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2. Does the Destination of the State's Share of the Punitive Recovery
Make a Difference?
Four courts have analyzed split-recovery statutes under the Exces-
sive Fines Clause, reaching conflicting results. Three of the courts
reached their conclusions based upon whether the statute allocated
the state's share of the punitive recovery to a public fund separate
from the rest of the state government. The fourth, however, con-
cluded that punitive damage awards in a split-recovery regime are not
subject to the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause without taking into
account the possible effects of dedication to an independent public
fund.
In McBride v. General Motors Corp.' ° a federal court considered
the constitutionality of Georgia's split-recovery statute'31 in a declara-
tory judgment action brought by tort plaintiffs.' 3 2 The court held that
the statute was unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.' 33
In reaching this conclusion, the court first considered the
Supreme Court's statements in Browning-Ferris.'34 Noting that the
Georgia law provided for the payment of seventy-five percent of the
punitive damage award directly to the state, the court reasoned that
the law "converts the civil nature action of the prior Georgia punitive
damages statute into a statute where fines are being made for the ben-
efit of the State, contrary to the constitutional prohibitions as to exces-
sive fines."1 35 Thus, for the McBride court, the fact that Georgia's
ment." Id. at 2806. One could easily answer this question affirmatively when considering
punitive damages in a split-recovery regime. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
130 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
131 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1994).
132 See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1564.
133 Id. at 1577-78. The court also ruled that the statute was unconstitutional under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the Georgia Constitution. Id. These hold-
ings do not bear on split-recovery statutes in general, since the Georgia law is limited in
application to products liability cases, unlike most split-recovery statutes. But see KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3402(a), (e) (Supp. 1992) (limited in application to medical malpractice cases).
134 See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1577.
135 Id. at 1578. The court's remedy for the statute's violation of the Excessive Fines
Clause-declaring the statute facially unconstitutional-is inconsistent with the Clause.
Unlike the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which categorically outlaws certain
kinds of punishment, the Excessive Fines Clause outlaws excessive fines, not the existence of
fines as a sanction. The Georgia statute merely enables punitive damages; it does not set
them at a level that will be excessive in every case. Excessiveness will depend on the
amount of the punitive sanction as applied under the facts of the case, not the mere exis-
tence of a civil fine. See Grube, supra note 71, at 871; Recent Cases, supra note 10, at 1696.
The McBride court concluded that the Georgia statute's allocation of part of the puni-
tive award directly to the state violated the Double Jeopardy Clause as well. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. 737 F. Supp. at 1579. However, this could only be true if the state had previ-
ously prosecuted the defendant criminally for the same act for which the defendant now
had to pay punitive damages to the state under the split-recovery arrangement. See United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
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statute allocated seventy-five percent of punitive awards directly to the
state treasury was the deciding factor in its excessive fines analysis.
In Burke v. Deere & Co., l3 6 a different federal court considered the
constitutional status of punitive damages awarded under Iowa's split-
recovery statute. 3 7 Burke involved a products liability action brought
by a farm worker who was injured when he attempted to clean out an
auger shaft on a John Deere Titan series combine. 3 8 The jury
awarded the plaintiff fifty million dollars in punitive damages after
finding that the defendant had acted with willful and wanton disre-
gard for the safety of another.'3 9 In post-trial motions to the trial
court, the defendant, relying on McBride, argued that the punitive
damage award was subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines
Clause because the state was to receive seventy-five percent of the
award pursuant to the Iowa split-recovery statute.
140
The court disagreed, distinguishing McBride. The court noted
that under Iowa law the state's seventy-five percent share was to go to a
civil reparations trust fund to be administered by the courts, and rea-
soned that the law therefore did not give the state any interest in the
punitive recovery. 141 Examining the differences between the Georgia
and Iowa statutes, the court concluded that "[a] clear distinction can
be made between funds that are to be placed into the state treasury
and those funds that are to be placed into a civil reparations trust
fund to be administered by the courts." 142 Accordingly, the court
held that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to the Iowa statute
because a separate public fund, not the state government itself, was
the recipient of the public's punitive share.143
places limits on the amounts that the Federal Government may recover in a civil action
after the defendant already has been punished through the criminal process).
136 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), re,'d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994).
137 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (2) (b) (West 1987).
138 See Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1230-31.
139 Id. at 1230. The trial court found this award to be excessive and reduced punitive
damages to $28 million, or about one percent of the defendant's net worth. Id. at 1238.
140 Id. at 1242; IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2) (b) (West 1987).
141 See Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1242.
142 Id.
143 Id. The Burke court appears to have reached the wrong result in light of the
Supreme Court's current test for determining when the Excessive Fines Clause applies. See
infra part III.B.2.
On appeal, an Eighth Circuit panel reversed and dismissed the punitive damages
award and remanded for a new trial on liability, causation and actual damages. Burke v.
Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994). The panel did
not directly address the excessive fines issue, nor did it discuss Iowa's split-recovery statute.
However, it held that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow the plaintiff's coun-
sel to argue to the jury that 75% of the punitive damage award would go into a civil repara-
tions fund. Id. at 513. As the panel reasoned, the defendant was prejudiced since "the size
of the verdict leads us to conclude that the jury indeed sought to create some sort of injury
1994]
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The Supreme Court of Iowa recently followed Burke's analysis and
concluded, like Burke, that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply
to punitive damage awards under Iowa's split-recovery statute. In
Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,'" an Iowajury assessed $1.5 mil-
lion in punitive damages against Owens-Coming in an asbestos suit.145
The trial court entered judgment, and Owens-Coming appealed, ar-
guing that the punitive award was unconstitutional under the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. 146
Owens-Coming contended that the fact that the government
shared in punitive awards under Iowa's split-recovery statute triggered
excessive fines protections under Browning-Ferris.147 However, the
supreme court disagreed, relying as had Burke on the fact that the
state's share of the punitive award is allocated to the separately admin-
istered Iowa Civil Reparations Trust Fund, rather than to the general
state treasury.148 Accordingly, the court concluded that the state's in-
terest in the public share of punitive damage awards is too limited to
invoke the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause. 149
The Court of Appeals of Oregon has also recently considered
whether the Oregon split-recovery statute' 50 subjects punitive damage
awards in that state to the restrictions of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Like Iowa's statute, the Oregon statute allocates the state's share of
punitive awards to a separate public fund, the Oregon Criminal Inju-
ries Compensation Account.151 Nevertheless, in Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser
Co.152 the Oregon court did not consider what impact, if any, this fact
might have on the excessive fines analysis.
fund or to improperly engage in a social reallocation of resources for the benefit of parties
not properly before the court." Id. Some split-recovery statutes mandate that the jury not
be informed of their distributive effects, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.73(8) (Harrison
Supp. 1993), or have been judicially construed to require that the jury not learn of their
effects. See Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1990).
144 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994).
145 Id. at 857.
146 Id. at 868. Owens-Corning also challenged the award under the Double Jeopardy
and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 865. However, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled against
Owens-Corning on these challenges as well. Id. at 865-69.
147 Id. at 868.
148 Id. at 868-69. The court noted that awards within the fund are not commingled
with general state revenues and may be disbursed only for specific statutory purposes. Id.
149 Id. at 869. Like Burke, Spaur very likely would have come out differently had the
court been sensitive to the Supreme Court's current test for the application of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. See infra part III.B.2.
150 OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1991).
151 Id. § 18.540(1) (c). However, if the prevailing party is a public entity, the statute
provides that the public entity shall take the whole award to the exclusion of the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account. Id.
152 873 P.2d 413 (Or. CL App. 1994).
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Tenold involved a claim for malicious prosecution, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and defamation. 153 The jury awarded
over $1.5 million in punitive damages against the two' defendants, and
they appealed arguing that the award violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on excessive fines.' 54 Although the court recog-
nized that the "government becomes a beneficiary" of punitive
damage awards under the Oregon statute, it ruled nevertheless that
the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply.155 The court emphasized
the lack of governmental involvement in the award, noting that a pri-
vate party had initiated the claim and the jury had imposed the judg-
ment. 56 Accordingly, it concluded that applying the Excessive Fines
Clause in the split-recovery context would not further the purposes of
the Eighth Amendment discussed in Browning-Ferris.
157
The chief consistency that one can draw from these four cases
appears to be that the degree of governmental involvement in the pu-
nitive award may determine the outcome of the excessive fines analy-
sis. The Tenold court was willing to recognize inadequate
governmental involvement based solely upon the fact that a private
party initiated the claim and a jury decided the defendants' punish-
ment. The other courts seem more likely to find sufficient govern-
mental involvement to satisfy the Excessive Fines Clause, and
distinguish instead on the basis of whether the state shares directly in
the punitive award. This Note will take up these issues further in part
III.B.2.
III
SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTES & THE TAKINGS & ExcEssrvE
FINES CLAUSES-CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY
A. Split-Recovery Statutes Do Not Effect Unconstitutional
Takings Because of the Limited Extent of the Plaintiffs
Property "Right" in a Future Punitive Damage
Award
The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence is muddled because
the Court has not clearly delineated what takings tests apply to what
kinds of property.158 Nevertheless, the Court does have some per se
takings rules, and different considerations apply depending on the na-
153 Id. at 415.
154 Id. at 415, 423. The defendants also asserted that the award violated their due
process and state constitutional rights. Id. at 423.
155 Id. at 424.
156 Id.
157 Id. Like Burke and Spaur, Tenold also very likely would come out differently under a
more sensitive analysis of the Supreme Court's excessive finesjurisprudence. See infra part
III.B.2.
158 See Burrows, supra note 30, at 461.
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ture of the property involved. 5 9 Thus, it is necessary to define the
nature of the plaintiff's property interest in an inchoate award of pu-
nitive damages in order to fully analyze takings challenges to split-re-
covery statutes.
1. The Nature of the Plaintiffs Property Right in a Claim to
Punitive Damages
Plaintiffs generally have a right to compensatory damages as re-
dress for a legally cognizable injury.160 By contrast, tort policy and the
laws of most of the states indicate that a plaintiff has no inherent right
to an award of punitive damages. 161 Thus, a punitive recovery beyond
a plaintiff's litigation costs is a windfall to the plaintiff.162 Many legal
authorities have argued that it is anomalous that punitive damages-a
windfall-should ever go to a plaintiff.163
Consistent with the view that plaintiffs have no vested property
right in an inchoate award of punitive damages, states may constitu-
tionally cap or eliminate punitive damages.'6 State legislatures may
eliminate punitive damages because they have the constitutional
power to abrogate common-law and statutory rights of action.165 Sev-
159 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (total diminu-
tion of all economic value and not a use already prohibited by common law nuisance is a
taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (perma-
nent physical occupation is always a taking).
160 See Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive Damage
Awards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 843, 849 (1993). Courts often characterize the right to an
award of compensatory damages as property. Id. Thus, ifa state were to allocate a portion
of a compensatory award to itself, the allocation would probably be invalid under the Tak-
ings Clause. Id. at 850.
161 See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 638-39 (Ga. 1993); Gordon v.
State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa
1991); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan. 1993); see 1 GHIARDi & KIRCHNER, supra
note 22, § 5.01; Kirgis, supra note 160, at 850-51; cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text
(authorities holding that punitive damages serve the exclusive goals of punishment and
deterrence).
162 See Note, supra note 8, at 1906 (arguing that the windfall should be calculated by
subtracting the plaintiff's litigation costs). There is, however, a valid argument that the
entire punitive award, including an amount equal to the plaintiff's litigation costs, is a
windfall to the plaintiff, since American law traditionally does not award attorney fees to
prevailing parties.
163 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text; see also Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638-
39.
164 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 39 (concurring opinion) ("State
legislatures and courts have the power to restrict or abolish the common-law practice of
punitive damages.").




eral courts have reasoned that this power also enables legislatures to
constitutionally cap punitive awards. 166
Indeed, the purposes of punitive damages, punishment and de-
terrence, 167 suggest that punitive damages may better qualify as a pub-
lic good than a private right. Punitive damages serve to punish the
defendant and deter her and other potential tortfeasors from acting
in ways that might harm society. Indeed, it is anomalous that individ-
ual plaintiffs should keep the entire punitive fine when the defendant
placed all of society at risk with her conduct.168 Thus, the punishment
extracted from the defendant, the civil punitive sanction, is a public
good that should go to the state and not the private plaintiff, much as
criminal fines go to the state. 6 9
Since punitive damages better qualify as a public good than a
plaintiff's inherent private right, the ability to receive punitive dam-
ages can best be characterized as a statutory benefit. In creating and
tolerating private suits for punitive damages, the state allows private
plaintiffs to receive what it could claim in full for itself-the civil puni-
tive sanction. Thus, punitive damages closely resemble traditional en-
titlements, since the state is in effect giving to private individuals what
rightfully belongs to the public.170 Accordingly, discerning the nature
of the plaintiff's property right in an award of punitive damages re-
quires the analyst to look to the Supreme Court's entitlements juris-
prudence, as a supplement to its takings jurisprudence, to understand
166 See Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. 1991) ("[I]f punitive damages may
lawfully be eliminated... then they may be circumscribed."); see also Wackenhut Applied
Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding Virginia's statutory cap on punitive damages against due process challenge,
and noting that economic regulation need bear only a rational relation to a proper govern-
ment purpose); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989) (statu-
tory limit on noneconomic damages constitutional). But see Henderson v. Alabama Power
Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 893-94 (Ala. 1993) (statutory cap on punitive damages invalid under
state constitutional right to jury trial).
167 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
168 Cf. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (arguing that it is
reasonable for society to receive the punitive sanction where society as a whole is placed at
risk, for example by products liability torts).
169 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massey, supra
note 8, at 1270 (noting that the theoreticaIjustification for punitive damages indicates that
they should go to the state, not private plaintiffs). It is important to recognize, however,
that a system that leaves some of the award to the private plaintiff as an incentive for
instituting the punitive claim on behalf of the state serves the public interest better than
one that allocates 100% of the punitive award to the state. After all, the state relies on
private litigants to bring punitive claims on its behalf. See supra note 66.
170 The Supreme Court has reviewed not only welfare benefits cases but also public
sectorjob cases under entitlements theory. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), overued on other grounds by Rust v. Sulli-
van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Since the Court has reviewed such varying "benefits" under
entitlements theory, it is not a great leap of the imagination to view punitive damage
awards as an entitlement.
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the constitutional principles bearing on the issue. As the analysis will
demonstrate, the extent of a private property right in a government
benefit depends on the drafting and construction of the state statute
or rules giving rise to that property right.
1 71
2. Split-Recovery Statutes Do Not Effect Unconstitutional Takings
Under Entitlements Jurisprudence
Since the right to an inchoate award of punitive damages is not a
vested property right, 72 but more closely resembles an entitlement, it
is helpful to analyze how the Supreme Court has addressed takings
challenges in entitlements cases.
In Bowen v. Gilliard73 the Court addressed a takings challenge to
a statutory decrease in benefits under the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) program. The decrease resulted from a 1984
amendment that required a family to take into account the income of
all parents, brothers, and sisters living in the same home in determin-
ing the family's eligibility for benefits.' 74 The AFDC program re-
quired that recipients of assistance "must assign to the state any right
to receive child support payments for any member of the family."1 75
Consequently, one effect of the expanded definition of "family" was to
require some recipients to assign more separate support payments to
the state as a condition to receiving benefits.
176
The plaintiffs in Gilliard contended that the net decrease in their
overall family benefits resulting from the expanded definition of "fam-
ily" was a taking. They also argued that the new definition, which al-
lowed the state to take part of one child's separate support payments,
effected a taking of that child's separate support. 177 The Supreme
Court dismissed the argument that a net decrease in the benefits was
171 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The supreme courts of Florida and Georgia appear to
have used similar reasoning in holding that their states' split-recovery statutes are not un-
constitutional under the Takings Clause. In Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993), the Florida high court reasoned that a plaintiff's right to
punitive damages depends on the extent and manner in which the legislature creates such
a remedy. Id. at 801. The court continued: "[I]t is clear that the very existence of an
inchoate claim for punitive damages is subject to the plenary authority of... the legisla-
ture.... [I]t may place conditions upon such a recovery or even abolish it altogether." Id.
The Georgia Supreme Court similarly reasoned that the legislature may constitutionally
regulate the amount of a plaintiff's punitive damage recovery. Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at
639.
172 See, e.g., Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638-39; Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801-02; Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa
1991).
173 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
174 Id. at 589.
175 Id. at 591-92.
176 Id. at 594.
177 Id. at 604-06.
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itself a taking, since the claimants had "no protected property rights
to continued benefits at the same level."u78 Then, to determine
whether the statutory assignment of child support benefits was a tak-
ing of the child's support payments, the Court applied the three-fac-
tor test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 179 "(1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to
which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action." 80 Ap-
plying these factors, the Court concluded that there had been no
taking of the child's separate support payments.181
The Court's analysis in Gilliard is instructive for a takings analysis
of split-recovery statutes for several reasons. First, Gilliard involves a
takings challenge to a decrease in government benefits, which is
closely analogous to the enactment of a split-recovery statute, by which
the state diminishes a plaintiff's "punitive benefits." Second, it ad-
dresses takings claims about two kinds of property-the family's gen-
eral AFDC payments and the child's specific separate support
payments.'8 2 If a potential future award of punitive damages is more
like an outright statutory benefit, the Supreme Court's analysis in Gil-
Hard indicates that courts should summarily dismiss takings challenges
to split-recovery statutes, since individual tort plaintiffs, like the AFDC
recipients, have no protected property right in a future "benefit."'
183
On the other hand, if an inchoate punitive award is more like the
child's separate support payments, Gilliard indicates that courts
should apply the Penn Central test to determine if the change in the
benefits package has worked a taking.'
8 4
178 Id. at 605.
179 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
180 Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 606 (quoting Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124); see also Concrete
Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993) (same
test applied to statutorily increased liability for withdrawal from retirement plan-no
taking).
181 Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 609.
182 Id. at 605.
183 See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993); Gordon v. State,
608 So. 2d 800,801 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); Shepherd Components,
Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991).
184 Since the punitive award does not come directly from the state, but only indirectly
through the state's tolerance of the plaintiff's pursuit of it, there is an argument for an
analogy to the assignment of the child's separate support payments in Gilliard. Those pay-
ments came directly from an independent source, the noncustodiai spouse, but indirectly
from the state because the state welfare benefits supplemented the family's income.
On the other hand, there is perhaps an even stronger argument for analyzing the
punitive awards in a split-recovery regime simply as outright statutory benefits. Like the
family in Gilliard, plaintiffs have no protected property right to a future benefit, i.e. a fu-
ture punitive award. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (plaintiffs have no inher-
ent right to an award of punitive damages). A plaintiffs claim to an inchoate punitive
judgment is thus more similar to a simple statutory benefit than to a court-granted child
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Applying the Penn Central test to split-recovery statutes demon-
strates that they do not work a taking if drafted or construed to give
the state a prejudgment interest in the punitive award.' 85 First, be-
cause the plaintiff receives only part of the total punitive award under
a split-recovery statute, there is some economic impact. However, the
impact is eased since punitive damages are a windfall to the plain-
tiff.'8 6 Second, there is no investment-backed expectation since plain-
tiffs cannot plan on receiving a punitive award before the cause of
action arises. Moreover, once the punitive claim does arise, plaintiffs
should know that any possible punitive recovery is limited because
they are put on notice by the statutes. 187 Finally, the character of the
government action does not indicate that a taking occurs. As the Gil-
liard Court wrote in a statement applicable to split-recovery statutes,
"[t] his is by no means an enactment that forces 'some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.' "188 Split-recovery statutes, especially those
that first deduct the costs of litigation before calculating the state's
share, still leave the plaintiff with a windfall.' 8 9
Some commentators argue, nevertheless, that there must be a
"quid pro quo"-that the state must give something in return for the
support payment. The support payment, unlike an inchoate punitive award, is a fully-
vested property interest that the child has a right to enforce.
185 The Colorado statute explicitly disavowed any state interest in a punitive award
prior to judgment. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987); Kirk v. Denver
Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1991). Consequently, it appropriated an actual
judgment, not an inchoate award, and the Kirk court held it to be unconstitutional. 818
P.2d at 273. The Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, construed Florida's statute to
give the state a prejudgment interest in the punitive award, and accordingly upheld the
statute. See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801. The Georgia statue appears to be explicitly drafted
to give the state a prejudgment interest in the award, see GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2)
(Supp. 1994), and the Georgia high court has upheld its validity under a takings challenge.
See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639.
186 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
187 Of course, plaintiffs cannot rely on any inchoate punitive recovery, since plaintiffs
do not have a right to receive a judgment of punitive damages. See supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
188 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
189 See Note, supra note 8. The plaintiff could, of course, lose on the punitive claim.
Nevertheless, even in such a case, the plaintiff's litigation costs are not the type of cost that
the public as a whole should share. Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the
plaintiff voluntarily brought the punitive action, knowing that defeat in court was possible.
Thus, the expected value of the future punitive award, after allocation of the state's share
and reduction for litigation costs, must have been great enough to offer the plaintiff a
sufficient incentive to proceed with the punitive claim. Moreover, society benefits from
punitive actions in jurisdictions not having split-recovery statutes by virtue of the retributive
and deterrent value of the punitive lawsuit, yet it need not compensate plaintiffs who lose
for their litigation costs. Consequently, the same rule should apply in split-recovery re-
gimes, since split-recovery states do not force plaintiffs to bring punitive claims any more
than do other states.
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curtailment-before the state can constitutionally enact legislation
limiting common-law remedies. 190 This argument assumes that puni-
tive damages are unlike statutory entitlements, in which claimants
have no protected property rights, because no "quid pro quo" is nec-
essary for the reduction or limitation of government benefits. How-
ever, even accepting that punitive damages are unlike statutory
entitlements, and that a quid pro quo thus is necessary to curtail a
punitive award, split-recovery laws nevertheless do offer a quid pro
quo. They offer at least as much quid pro quo as no-fault statutes,
which eliminate punitive damages, but in exchange lead to quicker
compensation. 191 Plaintiffs still keep a portion of the punitive damage
award under split-recovery regimes-there is still a windfall. In addi-
tion, those states that assign their portion of the punitive recovery to
public compensation funds offer the potential availability of compen-
sation through the fund as consideration to all potential plaintiffs for
the curtailment of the punitive award.'
9 2
Furthermore, other commentators have argued for viewing the
"quid pro quo" more broadly. Raymond R. Coletta, for example, ar-
gues for an expansive view of average reciprocity of advantage, in
which society as a whole, even the claimant, benefits from regulatory
takings. 193 Under this view, the plaintiff also benefits when part of the
punitive damage award is allocated to the state, whether it be through
reduced taxes or increased public services.
Split-recovery regimes present facts dissimilar to those of Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith,194 a case in which the Supreme Court
held that a county could not keep the interest that had accrued on an
interpleader fund, where a separate fee was charged for court services,
without effecting an unconstitutional taking.195 The interpleader
fund was a compensatory award, and thus any interest accruing on it
190 See Burrows, supra note 30, at 463.
191 See, e.g., Teasley v. Mathis, 255 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1979) (no-fault statute eliminating
punitive damages).
192 See supra notes 36-37, 4649 and accompanying text (discussion of the state statutes
allocating the state's share to a public fund). Moreover, even those statutes that allocate
the state's share of the punitive judgment to the state's general revenue fund still offer
benefits to the average citizen in the form of either increased public services, reduced
taxes, or both.
193 See Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New
Theo y of TakingsJurispudce, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 297 (1990); see also Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d
1176 (Kan. 1991) (taking a similarly broad view of the quid pro quo requirement).
194 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
195 Id. at 164-65. Cf United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (2% fee on




should go to the party who receives the interpleader funds.196 Puni-
tive damages, unlike an interpleader fund, do not serve to compen-
sate the individual plaintiffs, but rather serve the public purposes of
retribution and deterrence. Accordingly, the Court would probably
not view limits on punitive damages as a taking.
The Court's takings doctrine, however, is not always clear. 197 Yet,
the theories at its foundation support the view that a split-recovery
regime does not run afoul of the Takings Clause. For example, Glynn
S. Lunney argues that the essential takings inquiry is whether "the in-
dividual, rather than the community, should have control of the prop-
erty."' 98 In the case of punitive damages, which authorities widely
regard as a windfall to the plaintiff, 99 the answer is clear: the commu-
nity should control the punitive award both because the defendant
put the community as a whole at risk through his misconduct and
because the community can make more efficient use of the award.
3. Split-Recovery Statutes and the Supreme Court's Entitlements
Jurisprudence: Drafting to Give the State a Prejudgment
Interest in the Punitive Award Makes a Difference
The Court has held that a claimant's property interest in an enti-
tlement "must be decided by reference to state law."200 In the case of
a statute creating a property interest, the extent and limits of that in-
terest "can be determined only by an examination of the particular
statute or ordinance in question."
20 '
In Board of Regents v. Roth,202 the Court considered a Professor's
claims that he was entitled to procedural due process protections
prior to termination of his employment at a state university because
he had a property interest in future employment.20 3 In addressing
Roth's claims, the Court recognized that property interests "are cre-
ated and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from.., state law-rules or understandings that
196 Likewise, a statute that apportioned compensatoy damages between private plaintiffs
and the state would very likely be unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. See supra
note 160 and accompanying text.
197 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (noting that
the Supreme Court relies on ad hoc, factual inquiries rather than a set formula in deter-
mining whether governmental regulation of property constitutes a taking).
198 Glynn S. LunneyJr., A Critical Reexamination of the TakingsJurisprudence, 90 MicH. L.
Rxv. 1892, 1895 (1992).
199 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
200 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
201 Bishop, 426 U.S. at 345; see also Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214
(1985); McCammon v. Indiana Dept. of Fin. Insts., 973 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1992).
202 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
203 Id. at 568-69.
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secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits."20 4 Concluding that the professor had no property interest
in future employment, the court reasoned that his "interest in employ-
ment... was created and defined by the terms of his appointment,"
which provided that his employment would terminate on a certain
date.2 0
5
Roth suggests that a takings analysis of split-recovery statutes in-
volves examining the state's statutes governing punitive damages and
discerning the boundaries of the property interest that they create.206
The cases analyzing state split-recovery statutes reaffirm this view. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Kirk v. Denver Publish-
ing Co. that the Colorado statute, which disclaims any prejudgment
state interest in the punitive award, was constitutionally infirm under
the Takings Clause.20 7 An entitlements analysis of the Colorado stat-
ute reveals that it creates a rather expansive property right in an in-
choate award of punitive damages. On the other hand, the supreme
courts of Georgia, Florida, and Iowa held constitutional their states'
statutes, which do not contain disavowals of any state interest.208
Here, entitlements analysis indicates that the statutes created only a
restricted private property right in an inchoate award of punitive dam-
ages, since the plaintiff's recovery is conditioned on the allocation of a
percentage of the award to the state. Indeed, the Georgia statute,
204 Id. at 577.
205 Id. at 578. In the companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), overruled on other grounds by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court held
that a teacher at a state college might have a legitimate claim to a property interest in
employment and affirmed the Court of Appeals' opinion remanding the case to the Dis-
trict Court for a determination of any possible property interest. 408 U.S. at 602-03. The
Court recognized that Sindermann might have a claim to a property interest despite the
lack of an explicit understanding that he had tenure. Id. at 600-01. Instead, looking to
state law to discern the existence of a property interest as it did in Roth, id. at 602 n.7, the
Court concluded that a property interest could also arise out of implicit understandings
that justify a claim of entitlement. Id. at 601-02.
Sindermann reaffirms the takings analysis of split-recovery statutes that this Note pro-
poses. Although it suggests that implicit understandings can give rise to a property inter-
est, it also looks to state law to determine the extent of any such interest. In the split-
recovery setting, it is unlikely that any implicit understandings between the state and po-
tential punitive damages claimants could create a viable property interest in an inchoate
punitive award when the explicit understandings indicates that the interest was restricted.
If the state drafts its split-recovery statute to indicate clearly the limited nature of a prop-
erty interest in a prospective punitive award, this explicit definition should act to restrict
any potential implicit understandings that a full property interest exists.
206 Although Roth discussed property interests in the due process context, its analysis
of the creation and limitation of property interests is applicable in the takings context as
well. See Cynthia R Farina, ConceivingDue Process, 3 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 189, 206 (1991)
(observing that the Court's entitlements doctrine has implications not only for procedural
due process, but also for takings analysis and substantive due process; but generally criticiz-
ing Roth's positivist approach to defining property interests).
207 Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991).
208 See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
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which explicitly gives the state all the rights of ajudgment creditor,20 9
creates the most limited private property claim to a future award of
punitives.
Thus, the manner in which the legislature drafts the statute
makes a difference. Courts are most likely to strike down those stat-
utes that disaffirm a prejudgment state interest in punitives because
they create an expansive private right to punitive awards. On the
other hand, courts are least likely to hold those statutes constitution-
ally infirm that explicitly give the state a prejudgment interest in the
punitive award, since such statutes restrict the plaintiff's property
interest.2 10
Nevertheless, a properly drafted statute may still be subject to a
takings challenge on another ground. Plaintiffs may claim that these
statutes impose unconstitutional conditions on the plaintiff's receipt
of a punitive award.
4. Split-Recovery Statutes Do Not Impose Unconstitutional Conditions
on the Plaintiff's Receipt of a Punitive Award
The United States Supreme Court held in Nollan v. Calfornia
Coastal Commission21' that it was unconstitutional for a government au-
thority to require a landowner to grant a permanent easement across
his beachfront property as a condition to receiving a building permit
where the permit condition did not serve the "same governmental
purpose" as a complete ban on development. In Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, the Court similarly struck down an interpleader arrangement
that provided for interest on the deposited sum, which the govern-
ment then took for itself.2 12
It is unlikely that the Court would scrutinize split-recovery statutes
to the same extent as the building permit condition or the inter-
pleader arrangement, given the special public nature of punitive dam-
ages2 13 compared with the inherently private nature of a property
right in land or interest on a sum earmarked for compensation. Nev-
ertheless, even if the Court were to fully scrutinize split-recovery stat-
utes under its unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence, it is likely
that the statutes would meet the nexus test of NollanY14 The purposes
of split-recovery statutes are closely related to the purposes of punitive
209 See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e) (2) (Supp. 1994).
210 See Note, supra note 8, at 1916.
211 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
212 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
213 See supra part III.A.1.
214 The Supreme Court refined the Nollan nexus test in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.
Ct. 2309 (1994). Dolan considered the degree of nexus required between a permit condi-
tion and the legitimate state interest in regulating property. In Dolan the Court concluded
that there must be some "rough proportionality" (i.e. "related both in nature and extent")
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damages in general-achieving optimal levels of punishment and de-
terrence of malicious or outrageous behavior. Indeed, split-recovery
statutes enhance the social value of punitive damages by eliminating
windfalls to plaintiffs while maintaining a remedy to deter and punish
socially unacceptable conduct.
21 5
Another case addressing unconstitutional conditions deals with
facts more analogous to those in a split-recovery system, and indicates
that the courts should hold split-recovery statutes constitutional under
the Takings Clause. Dames & Moore v. Regan,216 the Iranian claims
case, involved President Carter's revocation of conditional attach-
ments that creditors with claims against Iran had obtained against Ira-
nian assets. In the wake of the seizure of the American Embassy and
the taking of hostages in Tehran, President Carter froze all Iranian
assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 21 7 The Secretary
of the Treasury authorized prejudgment attachments against Iranian
assets, but made it clear that the attachments were conditional and
could be revoked at any time.218 Later, the President revoked and
nullified all attachments against Iranian assets pursuant to the agree-
ment with Iran that provided for the release of the American hos-
tages. 219 Thus, creditors with claims against Iran no longer had
frozen assets against which to satisfy their claims. 220 A creditor chal-
lenged the nullification of the attachments, claiming that it worked an
unconstitutional taking of its property interest.22'
The Supreme Court rejected the creditor's argument. It ob-
served that the creditor "was on notice of the contingent nature of its
between the condition and the legitimate purpose the state seeks to achieve by the regula-
tion. Id. at 2319.
It is likely that the restrictions of Nollan and Dolan would not apply in the split-recovery
context. Those decisions concerned adjudicative-type determinations imposing conditions
on permits to develop land. Split-recovery statutes, on the other hand, are legislative deter-
minations imposing conditions on the recovery of tort damages.
215 See supra part I.B.3.
216 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
217 Id at 662-63.
218 Id. at 663. In addition, the President suspended the entry of anyjudgment in a
proceeding against Iran. Id
219 Id. at 665. The agreement provided for the establishment of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, which would decide all claims between United States nationals and the
Government of Iran. Id It also called for the return of all Iranian assets in the United
States to Iran, and the dedication of $1 billion of these assets to the creation of a fund to
satisfy thejudgments of the Claims Tribunal. I&
220 They could, of course, still bring claims before the Claims Tribunal, see supra note
219, but their chances of achieving full recovery were limited in that forum. See LAWREN CE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrtToNAL LAw § 9-7 (2d ed. 1988). Consequently, the creditors
did suffer a loss when the President revoked the attachments, since a recovery on their
claims was no longer secure. As Tribe observes, the revocation left creditors with "unen-
forceable and essentially worthless claims." Id.
221 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 n.6.
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interest in the frozen assets." 222 Deciding the challenge on the basis
of the creditor's attenuated property interest, the Court concluded
that, because of the President's orders making the attachments condi-
tioned upon revocation at any time, the creditor "did not acquire any
'property' interest in its attachments of the sort that would support a
constitutional claim for compensation."
223
Dames & Moore demonstrates that it is not unconstitutional for
government to condition a right to recovery on some factor related to
public policy. It teaches that the positive law may limit a claimant's
property interest in certain cases where public policy dictates. Under
the rationale of Dames & Moore, it is not unconstitutional for a state to
limit a plaintiff's property interest in an inchoate award of punitive
damages by conditioning it, in the positive law that creates the puni-
tive cause of action, on the allocation of a portion of the award to the
state. Tort law and public policy support this, since punitive damages
more closely resemble a public good than a plaintiff's private right
2 24
Moreover, the damages sought in Dames & Moore were for purposes of
compensation. Thus, the Court's rationale is even more compelling
when applied to a claimed property right to a future punitive award,
since a plaintiff's claim to punitive damages is more tenuous than a
claim to compensation.
2 25
Professor Tribe's analysis of Dames & Moore is instructive on tak-
ings jurisprudence and can equally be applied in the split-recovery
context. Tribe observes:
The Court's holding in Dames & Moore-that there was no taking-
seems consistent with the broad contours of doctrine under the tak-
ings clause: unless the clause is to become a mandate for shackling
government to the model of a minimal, night-watchman state, only
a highly restricted set of fairly traditional, focused expectations will
be protected by the just compensation requirement.2 26
B. Punitive Damage Awards in a Split-Recovery Regime Are
Subject to the Limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause
Legal authorities and scholars have recognized that punitive dam-
ages are simply civil fines,22 7 yet the Supreme Court has long sug-
gested that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive
damages.228 The passage of split-recovery statutes, however, added
222 Id. at 673.
223 Id. at 674 n.6.
224 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
226 TRIBE, supra note 220, § 9-7.
227 See supra notes 53-54, 57-59 and accompanying text.
228 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1977) (Court has traditionally inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment as applying primarily to criminal punishments).
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new questions to the debate. 229 In split-recovery regimes, the distinc-
tions between civil and criminal sanctions diminish since the state re-
ceives part of the civil fine. Moreover, the action is no longer a purely
private one because the plaintiff brings the punitive claim, at least in
part, on behalf of the state. Thus, the arguments for applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to punitive awards are more compelling in ju-
risdictions that have split-recovery statutes.
1. The Historical Interpretation Argument: The Excessive Fines
Clause Originally Applied to Civil Punishment
Various commentators have argued that the Excessive Fines
Clause historically applied to civil penalties as well as criminal fines,
and that it therefore should apply to restrict the size of all punitive
damage awards today, not just those governed by split-recovery stat-
utes.23 0 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument that the
Clause should apply to punitive damages in suits between private liti-
gants in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,231 concluding
that its purpose was to limit the power of the sovereign, not the recov-
eries of private parties.2 32 However, the Court left open the question
whether the Clause would apply in a qui tam action-where a private
party brings suit on behalf of the government and the government
shares in the recovery.
2 33
2. The Argument for Application of the Excessive Fines Clause to
Punitive Awards in Split-Recovery Regimes
In Browning-Ferris, a suit arising between private litigants in Ver-
mont, the Court declined to apply the limitations of the Excessive
Fines Clause to a six million dollar punitive award.2 34 The majority, in
examining the language and history of the Clause, explained why it
did not apply in the case at bar: "[T] he government of Vermont has
not taken a positive step to punish,.. . nor has it used the civil courts
to extract large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising rev-
enue or disabling some individual." 235 Thus, the lack of governmen-
tal involvement in the punitive action foreclosed the applicability of
the Clause in Browning-Ferris.
229 See Ghiardi, supra note 53 (analyzing the applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause
to punitive damages in a split-recovery regime).
230 See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of
the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 CooLuE L. Rav. 667 (1988); Massey, supra note 8; Andrew M.
Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendmen 85 MicH. L. Ray. 1699 (1987).
231 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
232 Id. at 271-72.
233 Id. at 276 n.21.
234 Id. at 259-60, 275-76.
235 Id. at 275.
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Nevertheless, despite the majority's statement that it was declin-
ing to decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies in qui tam
actions, 23 6 Justice O'Connor intimated in Browning-Ferris that the ma-
jority's reasoning makes the Clause applicable to punitive damages in
a split-recovery system. She noted that the Court, "by relying so heav-
ily on the distinction between governmental involvement and purely
private suits .... suggests... that the Excessive Fines Clause will place
some limits on awards of punitive damages that are recovered by a
governmental entity."237 Commentators have persuasively argued
likewise.23
8
James D. Ghiardi, for example, has argued that the Excessive
Fines Clause should apply to punitive damages in split-recovery re-
gimes under the Court's reasoning in Browning-Ferris.23 9 He observes
that punitive damages are strongly analogous to criminal fines in situ-
ations where the state receives part of the punitive award.2 40 Ghiardi
then draws on the majority's statement that Vermont was not using
"the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for the pur-
pose of raising revenue or disabling some individual,"24' as well as
O'Connor's dissent, to conclude that the Supreme Court is moving
toward applying the Excessive Fines Clause to punitive awards in split-
recovery regimes. 2
42
A recent Supreme Court decision makes the argument even more
compelling that the Excessive Fines Clause should apply to punitive
damages in a split-recovery system. In Austin v. United States,243 a civil
forfeiture action, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause may
apply in civil actions.244 The Court reasoned that the civil-criminal
distinction does not govern the applicability of the Clause. Rather,
remarking that "It]he purpose of the Eighth Amendment... was to
limit the government's power to punish," the Court concluded that
the true test for whether the Clause should apply is whether the sanc-
tion imposed constitutes punishment in which the government is in-
volved.2 45 Defining "punishment," the Court noted that "a civil
236 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Florida's split-recovery statute as an example).
238 See Ghiardi, supra note 53; Kirgis, supra note 160; Recent Cases, supra note 10.
239 See Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 125-26.
240 Id. at 123-24.
241 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275.
242 See Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 125-26.
243 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
244 Id. at 2812.
245 Id. at 2805 ("The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract
payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense.' ") (quoting Brown-
ing-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265). In Austin, the Court again left open the question whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applies in qui tam actions, as it had done in Browning-Feris. 113 S.
Ct. at 2804 n.3.
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sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrence purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand
the term." 24
6
Browning-Ferris and Austin, taken together, construct a two part
test for determining whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to a
specific sanction. First, a court must decide on the basis of the parties
involved, both named and unnamed, whether the Clause could oper-
ate in the particular action. Second, if the answer to the first inquiry is
affirmative, a court must then determine whether the nature of the
specific sanction invokes the protection of the Clause.
The threshold question is whether the Excessive Fines Clause
could apply in a particular action. This inquiry entails determining
whether the government is involved in imposing the sanction by tak-
ing "a positive step to punish" or using "the civil courts to extract large
payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or disa-
bling some individual."247 Punitive damage actions in a split-recovery
regime, where the government is an intended beneficiary of part of
the punitive award, pass this test,248 especially in light of the decision
in Austin that the Clause may apply in civil actions.
A recent lower federal court case supports this reasoning. In
United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co.,249 Judge Newblatt of the
Eastern District of Michigan ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause ap-
plied to the civil sanction in a qui tam action brought by a private
party under the Federal False Claims Act.250 Reviewing the Supreme
Court's decisions in Browning-Ferris, Austin, and United States v.
Halper,25' Judge Newblatt reasoned that the Clause applied because
the private party instituted the qui tam action on behalf of the govern-
ment, and the government shared in the judgment.252 This analysis
246 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448
(1989)).
247 Browming-Fris, 492 U.S. at 275. The fact that punitive damages serve public pur-
poses and that the government provides the forum for litigation alone is not enough to
justify application of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id.
248 Id. at 298-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ghiardi,
supra note 53.
249 840 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
250 Id. at 74.
251 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The Court ruled in Halper that the DoubleJeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, limits the government's power to bring a
subsequent civil action against a defendant, who has already sustained a criminal penalty
on the basis of the same conduct, to the extent the sanction in the civil action qualifies as
"punishment". Id. at 449-50. Similar to the position it would take in Austin and Browning-
Ferris, see supra notes 233 & 245 and accompanying text, the Court refused to decide in
Halper whether the Double Jeopardy Clause would apply if the subsequent civil suit were a
qui tam action. Id. at 451 n.11.
252 840 F. Supp. at 74.
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seems equally applicable to punitive damages in a split-recovery re-
gime.253 It is difficult to contend, for example, that Daniel Conkle did
not in substance bring his punitive claim against Mack Trucks on be-
half of the State of Georgia, and it is indisputable that the state shared
in the two million dollar punitive award after the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the validity of Georgia's split-recovery statute.
254
Once it is settled that the Excessive Fines Clause could apply in a
particular action, a court must then consider whether the Clause re-
stricts the specific sanction. The analyses of the lower federal courts
reviewing the Austin opinion indicate that the dispositive question in
deciding whether the Excessive Fines Clause limits a specific sanction
is whether that sanction serves purely remedial goals or is "in any part
punitive." 255 For example, money that constitutes the proceeds of a
drug sale is contraband and, consequently, its forfeiture is purely re-
medial, whereas the forfeiture of money merely used to facilitate a
drug transaction is punitive at least in part.256 The Excessive Fines
Clause would apply only in the latter case.
2 57
Punitive damages in a split-recovery regime satisfy the dispositive
test of Austin-they are not purely remedial, but serve to punish. In-
deed, punitive damages meet the definition of "punishment," as out-
lined in Austin,258 since they serve retributive and deterrent
purposes.259 Accordingly, punitive damages in a split-recovery system
should be subject to constitutional limitations on excessiveness.
260
253 Split-recovery statutes in essence give rise to qui tam actions for punitive damages,
since plaintiffs in a split-recovery regime bring the punitive claim on behalf of the state and
the state shares in the punitive recovery.
254 See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 486 S.E.2d 635, 636-37, 63940 (Ga. 1993). Geor-
gia's statute allocated 75% of the award, after deduction of litigation costs, to the state. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1994).
255 United States v. $45,140.00 Currency, 839 F. Supp. 556, at 558 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 ("The purpose of the Eighth Amendment ... was to limit the
government's power to punish.") (emphasis added); see also The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. RFv. 144, 207 (1993) (observing that the relevant question in
the Austin test is whether the sanction constitutes punishment) [hereinafter Leading Cases];
cf. McNichols v. Commissioner, 13 F.3d 432, 434-36 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that tax
deficiencies and penalties are remedial, not punitive, and therefore not subject to exces-
sive fines limits; also distinguishing Austin on the grounds that tax penalties are not
forfeitures).
256 See $45,140.00 Currency, 839 F. Supp. 556, at 558; United States v. $288,930.00 in
U.S. Currency, 838 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1993). See also United States v. Mongelli, 2
F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1993) (fines for civil contempt are purely coercive, not punitive, because
they attempt to secure compliance, and the individual can avoid paying by complying).
257 See $45,140.00 Curreny, 839 F. Supp. at 558-59.
258 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
259 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
260 Another threshold question is whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
excessive fines applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the
majority of the Supreme Court declined to answer this question in BrowningFerris, 492 U.S.
at 276 n.22, Justice O'Connor reasoned in her dissent that it should be answered affirma-
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The McBride court reached the same conclusion in interpreting
the Browning-Ferris dictum.2 61 McBride's remedy, declaring the Geor-
gia split-recovery statute facially unconstitutional, is inappropriate
since the Excessive Fines Clause prohibits only excessive fines, not the
mere existence of a fine.262 Nevertheless, McBride's basic holding is
sound: the Excessive Fines Clause applies to limit punitive awards in
split-recovery regimes.
The holding of the Tenold court, however, raises a crucial issue
with respect to the first part of the Browning-Ferris/Austin test: what
degree of governmental involvement is required for the Excessive Fines
Clause to apply in a particular action?263 Tenold concluded that the
fact that a private party brought the punitive claim and that a jury
imposed the judgment made governmental involvement in the split-
recovery action inadequate for the Excessive Fines Clause to apply.
2 64
Tenold reached the wrong conclusion for at least two reasons.
First, a court decision to award punitive damages, while by itself insuf-
ficient to qualify as governmental involvement in the excessive fines
context,265 is "an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."266 Second, the State
of Oregon has a prejudgment interest in punitive awards under the
Oregon split-recovery statute.2 67 This prejudgment interest greatly in-
creases the degree of governmental involvement in the action because
it signifies that a part of the sanction must go to the state and makes
clear that the plaintiff is suing on behalf of the state. Indeed, the state
has an interest in what the plaintiff does in the action. Taken to-
gether, the state's prejudgment interest in the punitive award and the
fact that the judgment itself is an exercise of state power build a
strong argument for recognizing sufficient governmental involve-
ment. When these two characteristics are present, the degree of gov-
tively. 492 U.S. at 284. Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the states by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Even if the Excessive Fines Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion does not apply to the states, most states have their own state constitutional excessive
fines clauses which could equally serve to limit the size of punitive damage awards.
261 See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
262 See Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 130; Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damages and
the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. Rxv.
1433, 1447 (1987).
263 See Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
264 Id.
265 See Broning-Fesis, 492 U.S. at 275.
266 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2342 (1994) (emphasis added).
267 See OR REv. STAT. § 18.540(1) (Supp. 1994) ("Upon the entry ofjudgment... the
Department ofJustice shall become ajudgment creditor"). A reasonable interpretation of
this language is that the interests of the plaintiff and state coexist in the inchoate punitive
damage award prior to judgment. Thus, the state can be considered to have a prejudg-
ment interest in the award.
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ernmental involvement should be sufficient for the Excessive Fines
Clause to apply in the punitive damage action. Accordingly, since gov-
ernmental involvement was adequate and punitive damages are not
purely remedial in Oregon,268 the Tenold court should have held that
the Excessive Fines Clause applied and proceeded to review the award
to determine if it was unconstitutionally excessive.
Burke and Spaur, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to punitive damages awarded under the Iowa statute because
the state's share of the punitive award is allocated to the Iowa Civil
Reparations Trust Fund, present questions both with respect to the
nature of the sanction and adequate governmental involvement in the
action.2 69 For the reasoning of Burke and Spaur to stand, either the
purpose of the Iowa statute would have to be purely remedial-not
punitive in any part,270 or governmental involvement in the action
would have to be so minimal as to fail to satisfy the first part of the test
for the applicability of the Clause.
271
However, the reasoning of Burke and Spaur appears to be flawed
under the Browning-Ferris/Austin test. First, although an advocate
might argue that the Iowa punitive damages statute serves remedial
goals because it allocates awards to a reparations fund, the Iowa stat-
ute expresses no purely remedial purpose 272 and punitive damages
generally serve to punish and deter under Iowa law.2 73 Moreover, the
fact that the state's share of the punitive award is allocated to the Civil
Reparations Trust Fund does not make governmental involvement in-
sufficient for the Excessive Fines Clause to apply. The fund has a pre-
judgment interest in the state's share of the award under the Iowa
statute, and the fund is administered by the state court administra-
tor.2 74 Thus, the state government has some control over the disposi-
tion of the state's share of the punitive award. Even such indirect state
control over a state-established "separate" public fund should be suffi-
cient governmental involvement to qualify as using "the civil courts to
268 See Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1990) (punitive
damages serve the goals of punishment and deterrence).
269 See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994); Spaur v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Iowa 1994).
270 See supra note 255 and accompanying text; see also Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 128-29
(arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause would not apply to punitive damage awards in a
split-recovery regime if the state's share went to a separate fund and the purpose of the
statute was solely remedial).
271 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
272 See IOwA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987).
273 See Godbersen v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Iowa 1989) (noting that the purpose
of punitive damages under Iowa law is punishment and deterrence, not compensation).
274 See IowA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (2) (b) (West 1987); Shepherd Components, Inc. v.
Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (plaintiff has no
vested right to an inchoate award of punitive damages).
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extract large payments... for the purpose of raising revenue or disa-
bling some individual. "275 Consequently, the Burke and Spaur courts
should have reviewed the punitive awards at issue for excessiveness.
3. A Framework for Determining Excessiveness
The most obvious and accepted standard for determining exces-
siveness under the Excessive Fines Clause is proportionality. The very
language of the Clause indicates that sanctions should be propor-
tional-that is, "not excessive." 276 This language suggests that propor-
tionality is at the heart of the Clause, since the excessiveness inquiry
almost always involves answering the ubiquitous question-"Excessive
compared to wha?" 277 Indeed, the Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence encourages proportionality review under the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause.278 Moreover, although the Austin majority
declined to establish a standard for determining excessiveness, 279 Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence suggested that proportionality would be in
order, at least in the case of monetary sanctions.28 0 Indeed, at least
two federal courts of appeals have applied proportionality review in
excessive fines cases in the wake of Austin.281
275 Browning-Feris, 492 U.S. at 275.
276 See Leading Cases, supra note 255, at 210-11 ("The plain meaning of the Eighth
Amendment's language leaves little doubt that a proportionality test is contemplated
under the Excessive Fines Clause.").
277 See Bittle, supra note 262, at 1450.
278 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (outlining factors to consider when
determining proportionality under the Eighth Amendment). The Court has held that pro-
portionality does not generally apply to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, see
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), but has intimated that the Excessive Fines
Clause is distinguishable and may require proportionality review. See Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993) (noting the distinction between the Excessive Fines
Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and remanding for the Eighth
Circuit's failure to review proportionality under the Eighth Amendment.). Indeed, Justice
Scalia indicated in Harmelin that the Excessive Fines Clause raises concerns distinct from
those of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 501 U.S. at 978 n.9.
Moreover, the Court has required proportionality between bail and the risk of flight
under the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1951) (suggesting that fines should not be disproportionate under the linguistically
related Excessive Fines Clause).
279 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
280 Id. at 2814-15 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) ("In
the case of a monetary fine, the Eighth Amendment's origins ... demonstrate that the
touchstone is value of the fine in relation to the offense."). Scalia suggested a different,
more instrumental standard for in rem forfeiture actions----"the relationship of the prop-
erty to the offense...." Id. at 2815. This second standard is of little importance in the
punitive damages context.
281 See United States v. Premises Known as RR #1, 14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219 (4th" Cir. 1993). Cf United States v. $288,930.00 in U.S.
Currency, 838 F. Supp. 367, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that the Seventh Circuit has re-
quired proportionality review since before the Austin decision).
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Various commentators have suggested that proportionality is the
proper measure of review for determining excessivIeness. 28 2 The start-
ing point for determining exactly what proportionality review entails
is the Supreme Court's analysis in Solem v. Helm.283 In Solem the Court
established three objective criteria by which to judge proportionality:
"(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions."284 These factors stand at the core of Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality review of punishments. Authorities have
adopted them not only in civil forfeiture cases,285 but have proposed
them as the foundation for excessiveness review of punitive damages
awards as well.2 8
6
Beyond these three factors, however, questions remain. One is
whether to include the defendant's wealth in a determination of pro-
portionality. Lyndon F. Bittle argues for using wealth as an additional
factor, albeit with great care because of the potential prejudice in-
volved in determining liability.2 87 Gerald W. Boston, on the other
hand, contends that consideration of the defendant's wealth is "anti-
thetical to the limitations of the [E]ighth [A]mendment," since a tri-
bunal should, in his view, impose punishment on the basis of the
282 See Boston, supra note 230; Bittle, supra note 262; Kenefick, supra note 230, at 1725;
Leading Cases, supra note 255, at 210-11. See also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300-301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (suggesting a proportionality standard using the guidelines of Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983)). But seeThomas P. Klein, Note, "Experimenting" with State Constitu-
tional Limits on Punitive Damages in California: Application of the California Excessive Fines
Claus 17 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 439, 477-81 (1990) (suggesting a treble damages model
linking the amount of punitive damages to actual damages).
283 463 U.S. 277, 290-95 (1983). Solem involved a challenge to a criminal sentence
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Court concluded in later cases that
proportionality is not normally required under that Clause, but did not assert that it was no
longer a viable standard under the Excessive Fines Clause. See supra note 278 and accom-
panying text.
284 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. The Court stressed that these criteria did not form an ex-
haustive list. Id. at 294.
285 See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known as RR #1, 14 F.3d 864, 875-77 (3d Cir.
1994) (in rem civil forfeiture action).
286 See, e.g., Boston, supra note 230, at 702, 734-43; Bittle, supra note 262, at 1450-55.
One important procedural question remains open regarding the Solem test: who is to
determine what is excessive, the judge or the jury? The Third Circuit panel in United
States v. Premises Known as RR#1, 14 F.3d at 876-77, left this question for the district court
to decide on remand. That case involved a civil forfeiture. It is plausible to allow the jury
to make the proportionality review in forfeiture cases. However, in puritive damage cases,
the judge most probably must perform the proportionality review. This will be true as a
matter of practical necessity when the jury made the potentially excessive punitive award in
the first place.
287 See Bittle, supra note 262, at 1455.
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seriousness of the defendant's conduct, not on the defendant's
wealth.28
8
Bittle seems to have the better argument for two reasons. First, if
punishment in general, and punitive damages in particular, are to
serve the goals of both retribution and deterrence, 289 then the defen-
dant's wealth is a concern. The same nominal award of punitive dam-
ages will have varying deterrent effects on defendants possessing
greatly disparate resources. To achieve optimal levels of deterrence, it
may be necessary to impose differing punitive awards for the same
conduct based on each defendant's wealth. Second, Excessive Bail
Clause jurisprudence supports Bittle. The financial means of the de-
fendant are one of the factors considered in fixing proper bail.
2 90
Another question left unanswered by the Solem factors arises in
the punitive damage context. The last two criteria of the Solem test
suggest comparing the punishment with that imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions.29' Yet
because punitive damage awards far exceed criminal fines, a compari-
son of the two may yield little guidance. In the Moseley case, for exam-
ple, the jury imposed a $101 million punitive award on General
Motors.29 2 It is highly unlikely that any criminal fine in Georgia even
approaches $101 million. Consequently, to take the Solem test literally,
a reviewing court would have to reduce the award against General Mo-
tors to whatever Georgia imposes as a criminal fine on delinquent
manufacturers of products. Boston advocates this result, contending
that " [-w] here a punitive damages award is significantly disproportion-
ate to the possible range of relevant statutory monetary penalties, that
fact should be some evidence of constitutional excessiveness."
2 93
In many cases, however, no criminal violation will be comparable
to the civil cause of action (such as breach of contract) that gives rise
to the punitive award.2 94 Indeed, as Boston notes, the types of con-
duct that produce the most punitive awards, for example medical mal-
practice and products liability, are not subject to criminal sanctions.
2 95
288 See Boston, supra note 230, at 742.
289 See supra notes 53-54, 57-59 and accompanying text.
290 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.3 (1951).
291 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
292 See State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632, 633 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101
(1994); supra note 32.
293 Boston, supra note 230, at 740. Boston gives excellent examples of the disparity
between punitive damage awards and criminal fines. For example, in Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1985), affd, 486 U.S. 71 (1988), a $1.6 million
punitive sanction was imposed on the defendant insurance company. Had the insurer
been convicted in a criminal trial for similar conduct, the maximum fine under Mississippi
law would have been $1000. See Boston, supra note 230, at 738.
294 See Kirgis, supra note 160, at 862.
295 See Boston, supra note 230, at 739.
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In such cases, only the first Solem criterion, "the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty,"296 remains to guide the proportion-
ality inquiry.
However, in those cases where a punitive award does have a crimi-
nal counterpart, the analysis will be more problematic. Solem seems to
indicate that the Excessive Fines Clause should limit the punitive
award to the level of criminal sanctions. Nevertheless, there may be
several ways for a court to escape this narrow interpretation of Solem.
First, the court could look only to other punitive damage awards, not
criminal awards. Judges should not read Solem's reference to
criminals and crime to exclude a comparison to other punitive
awards. After all, the Solem test originated in the context of criminal
punishment and did not have punitive damage awards in mind. Sec-
ond, the court may look to both criminal and punitive sanctions, bas-
ing its proportionality analysis on the average sanction. Finally, the
legislature could come to the rescue by increasing the maximum crim-
inal fines such that courts could impose either punitive damages or
criminal fines of the same magnitude for similar conduct.
An additional hurdle to constructing an effective framework for
evaluating the excessiveness of punitive damage awards exists in split-
recovery regimes. The allocation of the punitive award between the
state and the plaintiff gives rise to the question of whether the Exces-
sive Fines Clause should apply to only the government's share of the
award. A court should answer this question in the negative if the legis-
lature has drafted its split-recovery statute to give the state give the
state a prejudgment interest in the punitive award. Where the state
has a prejudgment interest, the punitive damages claim truly becomes
a qui tam action, one in which a private party sues on behalf of the
state and shares the recovery with the state.2 97 In such a case, the
private plaintiff acts as an agent of the state, suing on the public's
behalf to recover a punitive judgment for the public. Upon entry of
the judgment, the state allows the plaintiff to keep part of the award as
an incentive for bringing the punitive claim.29 8 Thus, since the public
is the primary beneficiary of the entire punitive award, the Excessive
Fines Clause should apply to the whole judgment, not just the state's
share.299
296 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
297 Cf. United States ev reL Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74-75 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (qui tam action based on the Federal False Claims Act; private plaintiff sued
on behalf of the federal government and the government shared in the judgment).
298 See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (characterizing the plaintiffs interest
in an award of punitive damages in a split-recovery regime as an entitlement).
299 Cf. Gilbert, 840 F. Supp. at 74-75 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (applying the Excessive Fines
Clause to the entire award in a qui tam action, rather than limiting its applicability to that
part of the award that went to the state).
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One final question remains. How should a court procedurally ap-
ply the Excessive Fines Clause to a punitive judgment that it deems
excessive under the proportionality analysis of Solem? First, unlike the
approach of the district court in McBride v. General Motors Corp., s3 o a
court should not declare the underlying statute unconstitutional.
There is nothing invalid, in the abstract, about an award of punitive
damages in a split-recovery regime. Only an unconstitutionally exces-
sive award is invalid.301 Second, once a court has found a punitive
award excessive under proportionality analysis, the remedy under the
Excessive Fines Clause is not to invalidate the entire award, but rather
simply to reduce it by the extent to which it is excessive. Thus, in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., the court merely reduced
the sanction from $290,000 to $35,000 in order to eliminate the
award's excessiveness.302 Accordingly, the process of reduction for




1. The Dual Dilemma: Facial Invalidity or Limits on Excessive
Awards
Split-recovery statutes face two constitutional problems: takings
challenges by punitive damage claimants and excessive fines chal-
lenges by defendants who must pay the punitive sanctions. The cases
considering the constitutionality of these statutes reflect this dual
dilemma.3 0
4
The first problem-the takings problem-involves challenges
against the facial constitutionality of the split-recovery statute itself.
However, the Supreme Court's takingsjurisprudence, especially its en-
titlements cases, 05 as well as the state cases considering takings chal-
lenges to split-recovery statutes,30 6 demonstrate that a properly
drafted statute will not encounter takings problems. As long as the
legislature drafts the statute to give the state a prejudgment interest in
the inchoate punitive award, the statute should survive any takings
300 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (finding the Georgia split-recovery statute
facially unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause).
301 See supra note 135 and authorities cited therein.
302 840 F. Supp. at 74-75.
303 See 2 GHLARDi & KIRCHNER, supra note 22, §§ 18.02-18.03 (discussing the procedures
and law governing remittitur).
304 See supra part II.
305 See supra part III.A.2-3.
306 See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Gordon v. State, 608
So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); State v. Moseley,
436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle,
436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & As-
socs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
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challenges. By drafting to give the state an interest, the legislature
limits at its inception the claimant's interest in a future award of puni-
tive damages. The takings challenge then collapses because the claim-
ant cannot establish a sufficient property interest for the Takings
Clause to protect.
30 7
The second problem-the excessive fines problem-does not in-
volve the facial constitutionality of the statute itself, but only the con-
stitutionality of any particular punitive damage award rendered under
the statute that might be considered excessive.308 Two factors must be
present for the Excessive Fines Clause to apply to a particular sanc-
tion: the litigation must include sufficient governmental involvement,
and the sanction must constitute "punishment."30 9 An analysis of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions and lower court cases interpreting the
constitutionality of punitive damages under split-recovery statutes sug-
gests that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to punitive awards in split-
recovery systems.
310
The two problems are related by the manner in which the partic-
ular split-recovery statute is drafted. If the legislature drafts the statute
to give the state a prejudgment interest in punitive awards, that inter-
est makes the statute less subject to takings challenges. However, that
same interest makes the awards more vulnerable to excessive fines lim-
itations. If the statute clearly expresses, 311 or is judicially construed to
manifest the government's prejudgment interest in part of the puni-
tive award,3 12 the nexus between punishment and governmental
power is much clearer under the test of Browning-Ferris and Austin.'31
Thus, the Supreme Court would very likely find punitive damages
awarded under such a statute limited by the Excessive Fines Clause.
Conversely, statutes that deprive the state of a prejudgment inter-
est in the punitive award, like the Colorado statute, 314 attenuate the
nexus between the punishment and governmental coercion, making
punitive awards less subject to constitutional limitations on excessive-
307 Cf Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981) (plaintiff "did not ac-
quire any 'property' interest in its attachments of the sort that would support a constitu-
tional claim for compensation.").
308 See Ghiardi, supra note 53, at 130; Bitfle, supra note 262, at 1447.
309 See supra notes 246-56 and accompanying text.
310 See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990);
supra notes 247, 257-59 and accompanying text; cf United States ex reL Smith v. Gilbert
Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (Excessive Fines Clause applies in qui tam
actions).
311 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1994).
312 See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1647 (1993); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
313 See supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
314 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987) (specifically disclaiming any
state interest in the punitive award prior to payment becoming due).
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ness. However, eliminating a prejudgment governmental interest ex-
poses the statute to facial challenges under the Takings Clause.
3 15
An analysis of two very differently drafted split-recovery statutes
will clarify the interplay between the two clauses. First, the Georgia
statute provides that "[u]pon issuance of judgment in [a split-recov-
ery] case, the state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor...
and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff... in securing a
recovery after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than
as punitive damages."316 Although a bit convoluted in its drafting, the
meaning of the statute is clear. Priority is given to the plaintiff's recov-
ery of compensatory damages, but when it comes to receiving puni-
tives the State of Georgia has the exact same interest in the judgment
as the plaintiff. Consequently, the Georgia statute effectively restricts
the plaintiff's property interest in an award of punitive damages, and
the Georgia Supreme Court was correct in holding that it did not
work a taking.3 17 Moreover, the state's prejudgment interest effec-
tively turns the action for punitive damages into a qui tam action. The
nexus is close between governmental involvement and the punish-
ment incorporated in the punitive sanction. Accordingly, punitive
awards governed by the statute are subject to excessive fines
limitations.3 1
8
Standing in bold contrast to the law of Georgia, the Colorado
split-recovery statute provides: "Nothing in this subsection.., shall be
construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exem-
plary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment
becoming due."3 19 This statutory disavowal of any prejudgment gov-
ernmental interest creates a broad plaintiff's property interest in in-
choate awards of punitive damages. Accordingly, the statute effects
unconstitutional takings, as the Colorado Supreme Court correctly
recognized.3 20 Furthermore, the lack of any prejudgment govern-
mental interest in the recovery insulates punitive damages in Colo-
rado from excessive fine limitations. Unlike the Georgia statute,
Colorado law does not turn punitive claims, de facto, into qui tam
actions. Although punitive damages continue to be "punishment,"
governmental involvement in the action is limited. The nexus be-
tween punishment and government power is attenuated.
315 See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); supra part III.A3.
316 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1994).
317 See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993).
318 See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1577-78 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(holding the Georgia split-recovery regime unconstitutional in light of Excessive Fines
Clause).
319 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (West 1987).
320 See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991).
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Thus, states face a dual dilemma-takings challenges or applica-
tion of the Excessive Fines Clause. In fact, states are likely to face one
problem or the other.8 21 Since states will have either a takings or an
excessive fines problem, legislators must choose which problem they
wish to face when drafting their statutes. Legislators should choose
the excessive fines problem, since it does not affect the facial constitu-
tionality of the statutes. Moreover, the excessive fines problem has a
silver lining in that it provides an answer to the excessiveness dilemma
of punitive damages.3 22 By drafting to avoid facial unconstitutionality
under the Takings Clause, legislatures will create the beneficial effect
of making punitive damage awards subject to constitutional review for
excessiveness.
2. An Exercise in Practicality and Policy: A Solution to the Dual
Dilemma?
One daunting question remains. Is it possible to draft or judi-
cially construe a split-recovery statute so that it will be free of both
takings and excessive fines scrutiny? Although this Note suggests that
such a result is undesirable, given the beneficial value of applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to potentially disproportionate punitive
awards, the question is worthy of brief inquiry. State policy makers
carry the ultimate burden of deciding how to craft the punitive dam-
ages regime in theirjurisdiction, and they should be aware of the total
scope of viable policy options open to them.323
The key to whether a split-recovery statute may escape the grasp
of both the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses rests in the "triggers"
that cause each clause to apply. For the Takings Clause, the triggers
are a property interest and inadequate compensation.3 24 Application
of the Excessive Fines Clause also requires two triggers-punishment
and governmental involvement.32 5
The court in Burke v. Deere & Co.326 thought it found a way out of
the dual dilemma. It ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to punitive damage awards subject to a split-recovery statute that
allocates the state's share of the sanctions to a separate trust fund ad-
321 See Kirgis, supra note 160, at 845-46, 873. But see Sloane, supra note 74, at 504-11
(proposing a model split-recovery statute that would purportedly escape both takings and
excessive fines challenges); infra part III.C.2.
322 See supra part III.B.2-3.
323 See Sloane, supra note 74, at 508 (asserting that a state can draft out of the dual
dilemma by prohibiting any governmental involvement in the action prior to judgment
and giving the government the status ofjudgment creditor upon entry of judgment).
324 See supra notes 190-93 (on inadequate compensation), 206-09 (on property inter-
est), and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 246-56 and accompanying text.
326 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994).
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ministered by the state courts.3 27 However, the court's reasoning is
unsound in light of both Austin's "punishment test" for determining
when the Clause should apply,3 2 8 and Browning-Frris' holding that us-
ing "the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for the
purpose of raising revenue or disabling some individual"3 29 establishes
the governmental involvement requirement. The nexus between pun-
ishment and governmental involvement in the underlying action is
still fairly close under the facts of Burke, despite the fact that court
administrators control the trust fund instead of executive or legislative
administrators.
Allocating the state's share of the punitive award to a state trust
fund also fails to protect against potential takings challenges if the
state had no prejudgment interest in the punitive claim. Despite
Judge Benham's suggestion in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. ConklV33 that a
split-recovery statute is less likely to be unconstitutional under the
Takings Clause when it designates a separate trust fund as the recipi-
ent of the state's share,3 3 1 the statute would be unconstitutional none-
theless if the plaintiff had a full property interest in the punitive
award. The only argument that supports Benham is that the plaintiff
is somehow being compensated for the lost property interest by the
availability of the fund for compensation. Although Professor Coletta
might agree with Benham's theory,3 32 the truth remains that when the
state has no prejudgment interest in the punitive award, the plaintiff
has lost a fully matured property interest and received very little in
return.
3 3 3
Accordingly, the most promising schemes for avoiding both
clauses involve providing the state with a prejudgment property inter-
est to avoid the Takings Clause, and then attempting to escape the
scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. A legislature can attempt this in
two ways: by making the punitive damages sanction purely remedial,
or by diminishing the level of governmental involvement in the
action.
327 See Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1242. See also Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,
510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994) (applying similar reasoning).
328 See supra notes 244-45, 254 and accompanying text.
329 Brouning-Fefris, 492 U.S. at 275.
330 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
331 Id. at 642 (Benham, J., dissenting).
332 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
333 Of course it would do the legislature that wishes to avoid both the Takings and
Excessive Fines Clauses no good in the above hypothetical to give the state a prejudgment
property interest in order to avoid the takings challenge. That would implicate the Exces-




Although it sounds appealing and would defeat the Austin pun-
ishment test,3 3 4 it would be very difficult to strip punitive damages of
their retributive and deterrent purpose, the very things that make
them "punishment."335 If a state did characterize punitive damages as
purely compensatory, and therefore not "punishment," the state's
share of the punitive judgment would have to come out of the plain-
tiffs compensatory recovery. This observation follows from the no-
tion that requiring the defendant to pay anything beyond
compensatory damages would be to "punish" the defendant, since
anything beyond compensation must serve the purpose of punish-
ment or deterrence. However, the state may not allocate a portion of
the plaintiff's compensatory damages to itself. That would be a
taking.3 3
6
It appears that the only possible way in which a split-recovery stat-
ute could escape the scope of both clauses would be to limit govern-
mental involvement in the action.3 37 However, this result is difficult
to achieve where the state maintains a prejudgment interest in the
punitive award, because the plaintiff in such a case essentially sues on
behalf of the state. Nevertheless, a split-recovery statute may ade-
quately diminish governmental involvement in the punitive action if it
gives the state's share of the award to a nongovernmental entity. For
example, if the legislature allocated the state's share to a charity or
other organization wholly separate from the government and free of
state control, this might break the nexus between punishment and
state power.
Thus, a split-recovery statute might overcome both takings chal-
lenges and excessive fines challenges. However, the legislator must
stop and assess the costs of achieving this result. The state must relin-
quish control over its share of the punitive award.3 38 The more con-
trol it maintains, the more likely the Excessive Fines Clause will apply.
However, if it relinquishes control, then the recipient of the state's
share may employ that money for purposes contrary to the public in-
terest and the state may be helpless to stop the abuse.
Consequently, even if it is possible to draft a split-recovery statute
in a manner that eliminates both takings and excessive fines chal-
334 See supra notes 244-45, 254 and accompanying text.
335 See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993); United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); supra text accompanying note 246.
336 Plaintiffs do have a right to a future award of compensatory damages. See supra
note 160 and accompanying text.
337 Cf Sloane, supra note 74, at 508 (asserting that it is possible to avoid application of
the Excessive Fines Clause by drafting into the split-recovery statute a prohibition on pre-
judgment governmental involvement in the action).
338 But see id. (arguing that the state can maintain the status ofjudgment creditor with-
out causing the Excessive Fines Clause to apply by drafting a split-recovery statute that
prohibits prejudgment governmental involvement in the action).
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lenges at the same time, it is undesirable for two reasons. First, the
state would lose its control over a public good-the punitive award.
Moreover, the state would eliminate the beneficial effect of constitu-
tional limits on excessive punitive awards.
CONCLUSION
Properly drafted split-recovery statutes thus provide an answer to
the two problems of punitive damages: the plaintiff-windfall and ex-
cessiveness problems. This result is achieved through the interplay of
two constitutional provisions, the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses.
By drafting to avoid constitutional infirmity under the Takings Clause,
state legislatures make punitive damage awards in split-recovery sys-
tems subject to the beneficial limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Finally, even though legislatures may be able to avoid both clauses
through deliberate drafting in very narrow circumstances, the direct
social costs resulting from such a statutory scheme would be high and
the problem of excessive punitive awards would persist.
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